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Investor and Worker Response to Corporate Downsizing of ESOP Companies: 
Wealth Effects, Productivity, and Performance 
 
Jeanean J. Davis-Street 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Finance, economic and management literature document the reduced agency 
problems, increased productivity, and greater financial benefits that accrue to firms that 
adopt Employee Stock Ownership Plans, (ESOPs). The literature also documents the 
increased agency problems, decreased employee productivity, and poor operating 
performance that usually accompany corporate downsizing activity. To date, none of the 
studies have examined the effect that downsizing decisions have on companies with 
existing ESOP plans; this dissertation fills that empirical void. In this study, two essays are 
presented that examine the effect of corporate downsizing on ESOP versus non-ESOP 
firms. 
In the first essay, I investigate the short-term wealth effects of the downsizing 
announcement using event study methodology. I find that there is no significant change in 
the wealth effects for ESOP firms (they are positive, yet small), whereas non-ESOP firms 
have significantly negative abnormal returns. There is, however, a significant difference in 
the abnormal returns of ESOP versus non-ESOP firms, where ESOPs have significantly 
higher abnormal returns. Finally, with respect to wealth effects, I find that downsizing 
interacts negatively with managerial ownership and with employee ownership, but there is 
a positive interaction between the ownership of managers and employees. 
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In the second essay, I examine the long-term employee productivity and financial 
performance of the downsized firms, as measured by Total Factor Productivity (TFP) and 
Tobin’s Q, respectively. I find that neither the percentage of employee ownership nor the 
level of downsizing has an impact on the productivity of the downsizing ESOP firm. 
However, the level of downsizing exerts a significantly positive impact on the productivity 
of non-ESOP firms.  
With respect to financial performance, the existence of an ESOP plan has a 
significantly negative influence on the Tobin’s Q of the downsizing firm. Furthermore, the 
level of downsizing has a significantly negative impact on non-ESOP firms, whereas the 
financial performance of ESOP firms appear to be unaffected by the level of downsizing. 
For Tobin’s Q, there is evidence of interaction between employee and managerial 
ownership for ESOP firms. There is also interaction between managerial ownership and 
downsizing for the TFP and Tobin’s Q of non-ESOP firms.  
  1
 
 
Chapter One 
Introduction 
 Within any corporation, there exists a nexus of contracts that is structured to 
encourage value-maximizing behavior by the stakeholders, thereby ensuring the long-term 
survival of the corporation. This combination of contracts includes those “agreements” 
between managers and owners (i.e., shareholders) and between managers and workers. 
Absent any transaction/agency costs, when these three stakeholders work in conjunction 
to maximize the value of the firm, the contractual relationship that exists has reached its 
ideal. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) abstract from this ideal world and instead analyze the 
firm within the context of property rights, agency theory, and finance theory to construct a 
theory of the firm that recognizes and incorporates the imperfections inherent in a market 
economy. One particular market imperfection that Jensen and Meckling expound on is the 
agency problem that occurs when a principal delegates some decision-making authority to 
an agent who, in turn, fails to act in the best interest of the principal. This divergence from 
the principal’s interest by the agent leads to a decrease in firm value.1 
In an effort to minimize the loss generated by the agency problem, the three 
corporate players—investors, managers, and employees—are motivated to create 
employment compensation contracts that will more closely align the incentives of the 
agent with those of the principal(s).2 One such incentive-aligning contract exists in the 
form of an Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP). Under an ESOP plan, a percentage 
of the firm’s outstanding shares are set aside and allocated to each individual employee’s 
retirement account, based on their annual compensation. As a result, employees who were 
once simply agents of the firm are now partial owners (i.e. principals) with an incentive to 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
1 Jensen and Meckling (1976) define the decrease in firm value as an agency cost. 
2 Generally, both upper management and external shareholders act as principals. Upper managers are principals in the sense that they have 
the power to fire workers and they have stock or stock options as a component of their compensation. However, they also act as agents to 
external shareholders, who are the “ultimate” principal with the power to dismiss the manager. 
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exert more effort toward maximizing the value of the firm and shirk less, thereby reducing 
agency problems/costs. Indeed, empirical studies show that employees of ESOP 
companies exhibit greater job satisfaction (Klein and Hall, 1988), have a decreased rate of 
employee turnover (National Center for Employee Ownership, 2001) and have higher 
productivity (Kumbhaker and Dunbar, 1993) when compared to non-ESOP firms. In 
addition, ESOP firms encourage greater cooperation between managers and employees in 
production decisions (Quarrey and Rosen, 1986), which leads to improved operating 
performance (Pugh, Oswald and Jahera, 2000). 
These characteristics of the ESOP firm are the direct result of employee stock 
ownership, which provides employees with a two-pronged benefit—increased wealth and 
firm ownership. The increased wealth provided by ESOPs comes from having part of 
employee compensation tied to the stock’s performance; as employee productivity and 
efficiency increase, the value of the firm increases which leads to greater wealth in the 
ESOP retirement benefits (National Center for Employee Ownership, 2001). The second 
benefit of ESOPs, firm ownership, allows employees to have greater access to internal 
financial information (Weitzman and Kruse, 1990), gives them some input on labor 
decisions (Rosen, Klein and Young, 1986), and allows them to vote on all corporate 
governance issues (National Center for Employee Ownership, 2001). Thus, when the 
financial rewards and ownership rights of ESOP plans are combined, they provide 
powerful incentives for employees to maximize the value of the firm.  
 The incentive-aligning benefits of ESOPs might be especially apparent during 
“good” economic times. In periods of economic and/or corporate growth, the firm 
prospers and its stock value rises. The workers’ employment is relatively secure because 
successful performance provides greater financial resources that can be reinvested in the 
hiring and paying of employees (Gerhart and Trevor, 1996).3 With high product demand 
and successful performance, employees have less likelihood of job loss and can focus on 
improving productivity and operating performance in an effort to further increase their 
future wealth via the ESOP. The net result is that ESOP participants act more like 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
3 Labor is a derived demand, which means that change in the demand for labor is a function of change in the demand for the product. 
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principals in “good” times (Iqbal and Hamid, 2000) and their incentives are more closely 
aligned with those of managers and external investors. 
However, ESOPs might not always result in incentive alignment between 
employees and external shareholders, especially during periods of declining corporate 
performance or decreasing demand. During these times, the objectives of the stakeholders 
could be at odds. For example, risk-averse ESOP employees—whose human capital is 
closely tied to the firm via the salary/wage and ESOP retirement benefits they receive—
might derive greater utility from ensuring their continued employment despite the need for 
downsizing. Alternatively, external shareholders—who typically hold a well-diversified 
portfolio and are more risk-neutral—might prefer the firm to initiate immediate, cost-
reducing layoffs. Meanwhile, the manager—who serves as both agent (to investors) and 
principal (to ESOP employees)—must determine a downsizing level that increases firm 
value without negatively affecting productivity and future corporate performance. These 
inherent risk-bearing differences between employees, managers and external investors, 
coupled with their complex agency relationship, causes incentive alignment in ESOP firms 
to be ambiguous in an environment of downsizing. 
So how, then, do downsizing decisions manifest themselves within an ESOP firm? 
One possibility is that ESOPs have a positive impact on the downsizing firm. Research has 
documented the higher level of communication and cooperation between managers and 
employees of the firm (Rosen, Klein and Young, (1986)). External investors might believe 
that this cooperative atmosphere alleviates some of the natural friction that exists between 
management and labor during a climate of layoffs. Furthermore, external investors might 
feel that the internal shareholders (ESOP employees and managers) have cooperated to set 
the optimal level of downsizing for the firm.  If so, then there is a “bright side” to ESOPs 
that make them an effective tool in addressing an agency problem.  
However, there is an alternative scenario; ESOPs might distort the incentives of 
employee-owners and managers, particularly during periods of corporate downsizing. 
Employees might be inclined to use their ESOP-acquired “ownership” powers to entrench 
themselves within the firm by influencing management to reduce the level of downsizing or 
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avoid downsizing altogether, even when downsizing is necessary. Thus, the very benefits 
that ESOPs convey to employee-owners might be used to thwart the manager’s 
downsizing objectives, even if downsizing is in the best interest of the firm. If external 
investors believe that ESOPs foster employee entrenchment and that the downsizing level 
is sub-optimal, then ESOPs are less effective in dealing with the agency problem (and 
could actually exacerbate it), thereby exposing a potential “dark side” to employee stock 
ownership.  
 The question of which side—“bright” or “dark”—is observed during downsizing 
events is an empirical question that has not been addressed by the literature. This question 
is especially interesting given the widely held belief that firm ownership by managers and 
employees should help to reduce agency problems. However, while previous researchers 
have documented the negative effects of downsizing, none has controlled for the existence 
of ESOPs, which is the primary vehicle for employee ownership. Thus, there is ambiguity 
as to whether ESOPs alleviate agency problems when employees, the very beneficiaries of 
the plan, are threatened with job loss. Furthermore, there is ambiguity as to whether the 
incentives of internal shareholders are aligned with those of the external investors during a 
climate of downsizing. It is this uncertainty that calls into question the long-term 
effectiveness of ESOPs, thereby setting the stage for the analysis contained in this study.  
 Given that the main objectives of ESOPs (which seek employment longevity and 
lead to greater corporate loyalty) are exactly opposite to downsizing (which seeks 
employee reductions and leads to a sense of betrayal), this study will determine if 
downsizing decisions impact ESOP firms differently than non-ESOP firms by addressing 
three important questions. First: For a given ESOP firm, are the wealth effects associated 
with the downsizing announcement different from those of non-ESOPs? If so, what does 
this difference indicate about the external shareholders’ reaction to downsizing? Second: 
Do downsizing decisions encourage the remaining ESOP employees to exert more or less 
effort toward value maximization ex post? And, how does the productivity of an ESOP 
firm compare to non-ESOP firms in both the pre- and post-downsizing period? Third: 
How does the operating performance of ESOP firms compare to the performance of non-
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ESOP firms? This paper addresses these questions by analyzing and documenting, within 
two essays, the effects that downsizing have on ESOP firms versus non-ESOP firms. 
The first essay is found in Chapter 2 and begins with a brief introduction and 
summary of the relevant literature on the wealth effects of downsizing and ESOPs, 
respectively. After proposing several hypotheses related to the stock price reaction of 
downsizing, event study methodology is used to examine the short-term wealth effects 
that downsizing decisions have on ESOP versus non-ESOP firms. Also, a cross-sectional 
analysis of the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) is performed to identify the 
possible sources of the differences between the two types of firms.  
I find that ESOP firms have small, marginally significant positive abnormal returns 
whereas non-ESOP firms have large and highly significant negative abnormal returns. In 
addition, abnormal returns for non-ESOP firms are negatively influenced by the level of 
downsizing whereas the abnormal returns of ESOP companies are positively influenced by 
the level of downsizing. There is also evidence that the percentage of institutional 
ownership, firm size, and union representation positively impact abnormal returns for both 
firm types. Finally, there is significant interaction between managerial ownership and 
downsizing that negatively impacts wealth effects. For low and high levels of employee 
ownership, there is significant interaction between ESOPs and downsizing that negatively 
influences wealth effects, whereas firms with medium levels of employee ownership have 
significant interaction between ESOPs and managerial ownership that positively influences 
wealth effects. These results suggest that ESOPs generally have a positive effect on the 
firm, even in a climate of downsizing. The benefits of an ESOP are even more pronounced 
when managers and institutional investors own a percentage of the firm that is 
commensurate with employee-owners. 
Chapter 3 contains the second essay, which begins with a brief introduction and 
literature review of the productivity and performance effects already documented for 
downsizing and ESOPs, respectively. Chapter 3 proposes several hypotheses related to the 
effect that existing ESOP plans might have on downsizing firms. This chapter also 
examines the pre- and post-downsizing period to determine: (1) whether there are 
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productivity differences between ESOP and non-ESOP firms, as measured by Total Factor 
Productivity (TFP) and (2) whether there are operating performance differences between 
ESOP and non-ESOP firms, as measured by Tobin’s Q-ratio.  
I find that downsizing has a positive impact on the productivity of non-ESOP firms 
but has no impact on the productivity of ESOP firms. Additionally, the percentage of 
employee ownership does not influence productivity. With respect to financial 
performance, downsizing has a negative influence on the Tobin’s Q of non-ESOP firms 
but does not appear to impact the Q-measure of ESOP firms. However, when productivity 
(as measured by TFP) is included as an explanatory variable in the regression equations for 
Tobin’s Q, productivity affects performance negatively. This result is counter-intuitive and 
necessitates further investigation into the link between productivity and performance—an 
investigation that will be conducted in a future study. 
Finally Chapter 4 discusses the implications and contributions of this dissertation. 
Given that ESOPs are adopted for the express purpose of aligning the incentives of 
managers and workers while simultaneously encouraging corporate loyalty, improving 
employee productivity, and increasing operating performance, this study finds that 
“normal” labor decisions such as downsizing (which are somewhat antithetical to ESOPs) 
do not negate the purported benefits of employee stock ownership. Instead, the ESOP 
firm exhibits low productivity and financial performance until downsizing activity shakes 
up the firm and “forces” the firm to improve its financial performance.  
Conditional on the firm’s decision to implement downsizing, this study analyzes 
the responses of both the external investors and employees of ESOP versus non-ESOP 
firms to determine whether the existence of an ESOP helps to alleviate agency problems 
that typically accompany downsizing decisions. The implications of this study will help 
managers of ESOP firms determine whether the stated objectives of employee ownership 
are being met. In other words: Do ESOPs encourage employee-owners to act more like 
agents or principals in an environment of layoffs? 
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Chapter Two 
 
Essay 1: Wealth Effects of Downsizing 
 
Introduction 
 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), external shareholders have long sought 
incentive-compatible compensation plans that motivate risk- and effort-averse employees 
to become more productive. They argue that the best compensation plans should 
simultaneously overcome the employee’s inherent disutility for exerting effort, encourage 
long-term, strategic thinking, and maximize the value of the firm. In short, the 
compensation plan should reduce the agency problem between shareholders and 
employees.  
One such plan that arguably accomplishes these objectives is the Employee Stock 
Ownership Plan (ESOP). ESOPs are defined contribution plans in which the company 
purchases a percentage of its outstanding shares to be held in trust until the shares are 
allocated over time to each individual employee’s retirement account.  Developed by 
Louis Kelso in the 1950’s and codified by the Employment Retirement Income Security 
Act of 1974 (ERISA), ESOPs are designed to align the interests of workers with owners 
by giving employees ownership stakes in firms. Studies show that ESOP employees 
demonstrate greater corporate loyalty (Klein, 1987), exert greater effort (Kumbhaker and 
Dunbar, 1993), closely monitor co-workers (Fitzroy and Kraft, 1987), participate in more 
of the firm’s strategic decision-making (Rooney, 1992), and accumulate more retirement 
wealth (National Center for Employee Ownership, 2001) than employees of non-ESOP 
firms.  In addition, ESOP firms report decreased turnover (Perun, 2000), increased 
employee satisfaction (Klein and Hall, 1988), higher productivity (Kumbhaker and 
Dunbar, 1993), and improved operating performance (Pugh, Oswald and Jahera, 2000). 
All of these findings suggest that there is a “bright side” to ESOPs consistent with Jensen 
and Meckling’s hypothesis that employee ownership reduces the agency problems between 
managers/shareholders and employees while increasing the value of the firm. 
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These benefits of ESOPs, when coupled with the tax incentives of ERISA, explain 
the growth of ESOP plans, especially within public firms where ESOP participants 
typically own between 5-10 percent of the firm, with some public firms having up to 30 
percent employee ownership.4 In public ESOP firms, employees who were once simply 
agents of the external shareholders are now, to a limited degree, internal shareholders of 
the company. As such, they have acquired many of the rights and responsibilities that 
ownership entails. For example, employee-owners have greater access to high-level 
financial information that can be quickly disseminated to co-workers of the firm via the 
improved level of communication often found in ESOP firms (Weitzman and Kruse, 
1990). In addition, employee-owners have more active roles in determining labor decisions 
of firms because of their cooperative relationship with management (Rosen, Klein and 
Young, 1986). Finally, employee-owners are able to exercise their voting powers in all 
corporate governance issues (National Center for Employee Ownership, 2001), and might 
therefore have some sway over management.5 This combination of powers—greater 
access to/dissemination of information, more input in labor decisions, and voting rights—
is typical of the ownership powers that employees of public ESOP companies enjoy, even 
for small percentages of employee ownership. 
As the percentage of employee ownership increases, employees gain an even 
greater voice and level of influence within the firm. More importantly, as partial owners, 
they might also have some decision-making power in labor issues, including the hiring and 
firing of personnel (Rosen, Klein and Young, 1986). If management believes that 
employee-owners can exercise “hiring and firing” decisions over them as well, then 
managers might be reluctant to antagonize workers in ESOP firms by significantly altering 
the workforce. Thus an important question arises: Do the benefits of ESOPs continue long 
after the initial adoption of the plan, or does the ESOP mutate into a tool that employees 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
4 Following the passage of ERISA, the number of ESOP plans has grown from 1,600 plans serving 248,000 participants in 1975 to 
11,500 plans serving 8,500,000 participants in 2000. Of those plans, approximately 1,200 are in public companies representing over 
5,000,000 participants. Statistical Profile of Employee Ownership. National Center for Employee Ownership, June 14, 2001. 
www.nceo.org/library/eo_stat.html 
5 Depending on the governance rules established during the initial set-up, employees have the ability to direct the ESOP trustee in all 
voting matters, thus giving employees a voice in corporate decisions. 
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use to further their own employment interests (via employee entrenchment) at the expense 
of the firm’s value?  
Employee entrenchment occurs when workers are able to ensure their continued 
employment even when layoffs or dismissals are justified, as would be the case during 
periods of decreasing product demand or poor operating performance. Although the firm’s 
financial health might be maximized by the elimination of jobs, the employee-owner’s job 
security is threatened by the need for downsizing and they might prefer that no (or a 
minimal level of) downsizing takes place. Given their preference for a lower level of 
downsizing, ESOP employees might use their increased ownership “power” to influence 
managers to decrease the level of downsizing. If employees successfully persuade 
managers to downsize at a less-than-optimal level or not at all, then employee-owners 
have become entrenched in the firm. Thus, the ESOP might have become an instrument by 
which employee-owners wield authority over management instead of an incentive-
alignment tool, thereby exposing the “dark side” of ESOPs. 
Because there is a “bright side” and “dark side” to ESOPs, it is important to 
understand which side manifests itself during a climate of downsizing. The “bright side” of 
ESOPs has already been documented for the firm, but most of the research touting ESOPs 
has been based on the years immediately following the adoption of an ESOP plan.6 
Whether the positive benefits of ESOPs continue over the long run or during a climate of 
downsizing is another matter.  
During downsizing events, external investors might feel that ESOPs address the 
information asymmetry that usually exists between managers and employees so that 
employees are better informed about the true financial health of the firm. Because of the 
greater level of information exchange, better-informed ESOP employees might understand 
and accept the need for layoffs that benefit the firm. Thus, evidence of the positive effects 
of ESOPs could manifest itself in the form of positive wealth effects, which might reflect 
external investors’ belief that ESOP employees work in conjunction with management to 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
6
 Most researchers have examined ESOPs two to five years after the plan adoption year. Few researchers have looked at the impact of 
ESOPs on the wealth effects, productivity and performance of the firm after that period, and none has examined the effect of ESOPs on 
downsizing firms.  
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set the optimal downsizing level. Or it might be evidenced by higher levels of productivity 
and/or corporate performance, ex post, despite the negative impacts that downsizing 
usually exerts. If any of these outcomes occur during downsizing events, it could be an 
indication that the “bright side” of ESOPs overcomes the negative effect of corporate 
layoffs.  
Alternatively, the “dark side” of ESOPs, if it exists, is manifested within the firm 
when employee-owners use the very “powers” that ESOPs provide to intimidate and 
ensnare management. If managers, wary of the influence of empowered employee-owners, 
collude with them to ensure their mutual employment, even in the case of decreasing 
product demand and firm performance, then the internal owners (managers and 
employees) are expropriating value from external investors. Indeed, Gamble (2000) finds 
that with higher percentages of employee ownership, management views employees as 
“friendly votes.” At the margin, “ensnared” managers are unlikely to make decisions that 
alienate a potential base of support.  
This possible collusion between employees and managers can be an undesirable 
side effect of ESOPs unanticipated by external investors. When it is combined with the 
empowerment of self-interested, risk-averse employees, then it brings into question the 
long-term ability of ESOPs to control the agency problem and maximize the value of the 
firm. Prior to the firm’s adoption of an ESOP, employees are simply agents of the firm 
with little or no power. However, the existence of ESOPs within the firm means that 
external investors must deal with employees who are empowered as co-owners and whose 
interests are more often aligned with managers in matters related to employment security. 
Thus ESOPs might have created a more virulent form of the agency problem, especially 
when poor economic conditions and operating performance require employee downsizing. 
Within ESOP firms, external investors might find themselves battling the combined 
strength of managers and employees, who might have acquired powers that allow them to 
better maximize their own utility at the expense of external shareholders. The possible 
conflict between internal investors (managers/employees) and external investors provides 
the motivation for this study. 
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Using downsizing as the catalyst to which the market reacts, this paper examines 
the wealth effects that accompany downsizing announcements to determine if external 
investors interpret the layoff decisions of ESOP firms differently from non-ESOP firms. If 
external investors believe that the ESOP is beneficial to the downsizing firm, then the 
stock price reaction will be positive (or less negative than non-ESOP firms). It could be an 
indication that external investors believe that ESOP participants act more like principals 
than agents and the ESOP is effective at controlling the agency problem, even in a climate 
of downsizing. In other words, external investors might believe that employee-owners do 
not intimidate the manager into reducing the level of downsizing because it is in the best 
interests of the firm, despite the employee-owners’ potential loss of jobs.  
Alternatively, if external investors believe that ESOPs are detrimental to a 
downsizing firm, the wealth effects could be negative (or more negative than non-ESOP 
firms). It might be an indication that external investors believe that ESOP participants act 
more like agents than principals, and the ESOP, though effective in the past, might no 
longer alleviate the agency problem. External investors might feel that the ESOP has 
created a corporate culture in which managers and workers (who are both internal 
investors) have colluded together to ensure their continued employment at the expense of 
external investors. 
If the managers of ESOP firms are able to adjust the level of employment to the 
value-maximizing level whenever necessary without fear of reprisal from employee-owners 
and without negatively impacting the stock price of the firm, then ESOPs are an effective 
tool that can be used to align the incentives of employees, managers, and investors. 
Conversely, if ESOP participants use their increased decision-making power and greater 
insider information to capture or collude with managers to secure mutual employment, 
then ESOPs could help internal workers and managers become entrenched, thereby 
expropriating firm value from the external investors, which would be evidenced by 
negative stock price reactions.  
From these possible reactions by external investors come two testable questions: 
(1) Are there wealth effects associated with downsizing, and, if so, are they different for 
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ESOP versus non-ESOP firms? (2) If there is a difference in wealth effects, can the 
difference be explained by the level of downsizing, the existence of the ESOP, the level of 
internal (employees and managers) ownership, and/or any interaction between these three 
factors? These questions are addressed in this study. The answers to these questions 
provide insight into the labor relations, agency problems, asymmetric information, and 
corporate governance issues of ESOP firms. 
In addressing the first of the two testable questions, I find that there are wealth 
effects associated with downsizing and that they differ for ESOP versus non-ESOP 
companies. The decision to downsize an ESOP company results in small, yet 
insignificantly positive abnormal returns, whereas non-ESOP downsizing companies have 
a large and significantly negative abnormal return.  
With regard to the second testable question, I find that the wealth effects of non-
ESOP firms are influenced by downsizing (-), institutional ownership (+), reason for 
downsizing (+ or – depending on reason), and firm size (+). On the other hand, factors 
that impact the wealth effects of ESOP companies include downsizing (+), ESOP age (+), 
firm size (+), unionization (+), and reason for downsizing (mainly +). Further, I find 
evidence of significant interaction between ESOPs and downsizing (-), between 
managerial ownership and downsizing (-), and between managerial ownership and 
employee ownership (+). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II.2 discusses the 
relevant literature on the wealth effects of downsizing. In Section II.3, the hypotheses are 
developed using extant literature on ESOPs and their effects on the firm. The event-study 
methodology and a description of the data are outlined in Section II.4. Section II.5 
contains the regression results and analysis followed by Section II.6, which concludes  and 
discusses the implications of the results. 
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Related Literature 
 
A. Downsizing Literature 
 
 Downsizing activity occurs within the firm for a variety of reasons. Describing the 
decade of the 1990s, Jensen (1993) predicts that firms will undergo major shifts in their 
production processes as technology and new labor techniques transform manufacturing 
and service industries into more efficient workplaces. This shift in processes is precipitated 
by increased computer usage, relatively lower energy costs and growing global markets. 
According to Jensen, a necessary side effect of change is a decrease in employment as 
employees with twentieth century skills are replaced with twenty-first century technology. 
The resulting increase in downsizing activity during the decade of the 1990s is a testament 
to the accuracy of Jensen’s prediction. 
 The downsizing activity that took place during the 1990s was different in the sense 
that no sector of the workforce or category of industry was immune: managers were as 
likely to be laid off as auto workers and the pharmaceutical industry had as many layoffs 
as the construction industry (Gardner, 1993.) Just as Jensen predicted, the 1990s were a 
period of industrial revolution as companies folded and workers became displaced from 
many job sectors. 
 Despite the increased incidence of downsizing, very few researchers have analyzed 
employee downsizing. Specifically, downsizing and the factors that lead managers to 
institute layoffs have not been thoroughly examined in the literature. Most research looks 
at the manager’s decision to downsize, ex post instead of examining the ex ante factors 
that lead to layoff decisions. For example, Downs (1995) outlines three major reasons that 
firms downsize: (1) to generate positive stock price reactions; (2) to purge those 
employees perceived as being unproductive; and (3) to frighten the remaining employees 
into working harder. While these reasons are intuitive, there are no empirical studies 
testing their validity as downsizing reasons. 
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Hallock (1998) also provides a possible reason for the increase in downsizing. He 
documents the increased executive pay in the year following downsizing activity. If CEOs 
engage in downsizing with the expectation of receiving higher pay in subsequent years, it 
would explain the increased incidence of downsizing despite the negative wealth effects 
that accompany such announcements. However, after controlling for firm-specific 
characteristics, he finds that the CEO pay premium disappears. In fact, he finds that there 
is actually a small yet significant negative reaction. However, he does not determine if the 
decision to not downsize has an equally adverse effect on the manager’s wealth. Thus the 
results might be subject to truncation or self-selectivity bias.7 
 McCune, Beatty and Montagno (1988) also examine downsizing, but they focus 
on alternatives to layoffs such as forced retirement, attrition, reduced hours, and wage 
cuts. They find that managers implement few alternatives to downsizing and instead use 
layoffs more often. They also determine that seniority, unionization and training costs are 
factors in downsizing activity—that is, employees with seniority, union representation, or 
high skill/ability are less likely to be laid off.8 
 Ex post, there are many factors that influence investors’ reaction to a corporation’s 
downsizing decisions, and a number of previous studies have examined how those factors 
impact the stock price reaction. Factors such as size of layoff, duration of layoff, whether 
the layoff is anticipated or unanticipated, reasons for layoff, industry type, and the business 
cycle have been suggested by Elayan, Swales, Marin and Scott (1998), among others. 
They find that the market generally reacts negatively to downsizing announcements as 
investors revise their expectations downward. Specifically, layoffs that are instituted for 
cost-cutting reasons, which are large in scale, which are permanent, or which are 
unexpected have a stronger negative announcement effect. In addition, firms that operate 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
7 By their very nature, event studies have an inherent self-selectivity bias. However, this research is explicitly defined as a conditional 
study—that is, conditional on the downsizing decision, is there a difference between the wealth effects of ESOP versus non-ESOP firms? A 
future study will examine the downsizing decision using two-stage least squares regression in which the downsizing decision is first 
modeled using logit or probit analysis and the results are then used in a standard OLS regression.  
8 Though there are alternatives to downsizing, this study does not include them in the sample. Firms that instituted reduced work hours or 
temporary workers are excluded. Some downsizing firms (~30) incorporated attrition or retirements into their announced downsizing 
levels, but amounts were trivial and incapable of being separated out.  
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in labor-intensive industries are more adversely affected by layoff announcements relative 
to firms that rely more on physical capital.   
 In a study closely related to Elayan et al., Worrel, Davidson and Sharma (1991) 
also report a negative stock price reaction following downsizing announcements. They 
find that investors react negatively to downsizing announcements attributable to financial 
reasons and that large or permanent layoffs have a stronger negative response. 
 Other factors that have been examined by researchers include declining demand 
and number of previous downsizing events. Lin and Rozeff (1993) find support for their 
decreased-demand hypothesis in explaining the negative stock price reactions that 
accompany downsizing decisions. Additionally, Ursel (1995) finds that investors react 
more negatively to the first layoff announcement of a firm than to subsequent 
announcements. 
 Other studies find evidence of mixed wealth effects. For example, Palmon, Sun and 
Tang (1997) examine the wealth effects of downsizing firms based on the reason for 
downsizing. They report that "declining demand" reasons lead to negative returns while 
"efficiency improvement" reasons yield positive returns. Similarly, Scott and Ueng (1996) 
find positive abnormal returns for downsizing firms, but only if a positive reason for layoff 
is given (such as “restructuring to improve efficiency”). Surprisingly, healthy firms that 
announce layoffs have negative returns, yet, if they provide a positive reason for 
downsizing, then investors react positively. 
 The research most closely related to this study is Chen, Mehrotra, Sivakumar and 
Yu, (2001), who also examine the wealth effects, productivity, and performance of 
downsizing firms. Using data from 1990-1995, they find that layoffs produce significantly 
negative stock price reactions. They also find that three years after downsizing, firms 
experience improved profit margins and increased labor productivity. Where my research 
differs from Chen, et al. is in its examination of ESOP companies, which will highlight any 
indication of an agency problem (i.e. employee entrenchment) that might exist between 
external and internal shareholders. 
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 The characteristic common to all of the downsizing research is the negative wealth 
effect that often accompanies downsizing. This common result raises an interesting 
question: if firms downsize out of necessity (eg. declining demand, low profitability), why 
are abnormal returns invariably negative? One reason might be that the level of downsizing 
does not coincide with external investors’ expectations (Jensen, 1993). If the downsizing 
level is greater than expected, investors might believe that the firm’s financial situation is 
worse than they originally thought.  As investors update their beliefs, they might value the 
stock at a lower price. 
 Another possible reason for negative stock price reactions could be that the firm is 
in a declining industry (Jensen, 1993). For example, during the 1990s, there was a 
systematic decline in the defense industry following the end of the cold war. Defense 
contractors were forced to lay off workers in order to maintain profitability. Despite the 
labor cost savings that resulted from downsizing, firms in the defense industry still had 
negative earnings. 
 Economic recessions might also lead to negative abnormal returns for downsizing 
firms (Jensen, 1993). When the market is in an extended downturn, layoffs might 
exacerbate the poor economic conditions of the firm. Each of these reasons are possible 
explanations for negative wealth effects, however downsizing reasons are not the focus of 
this research. Instead, this study examines the wealth effects ESOP versus non-ESOP 
firms, conditional on the downsizing decision. 
 
B. ESOP Literature 
 
 Extant literature on ESOPs invariably omits any discussion on the impact that 
downsizing has on the firm. In fact, this study is one of the first to empirically examine the 
role of downsizing within ESOP firms. Despite the dearth of research, it is still a 
productive exercise to look at the impact that ESOPs have on the wealth effects of the 
firm. Chang (1990) looks at the wealth effects of ESOPs that were adopted from 1976-
1987. He finds that the ESOP is a wealth-increasing event when it is adopted as a 
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leveraged buyout (LBO) or wage concessions. If the ESOP is used as a takeover defense, 
he finds that the wealth effects are significantly negative. For a sample of “pure” ESOPs, 
in which no LBO, wage concessions, or takeovers are present, ESOP adoption produces 
positive wealth effects consistent with tax benefits or incentive alignment.  The implication 
from his result is that ESOPs, by themselves, are beneficial to the firm. However, they can 
be easily manipulated by managers to entrench themselves within the firm. This 
entrenchment might also extend to employees if managers and workers collude to ensure 
their mutual employment during a climate of downsizing. 
 Chang and Mayers (1992) examine the wealth effects associated with ESOP 
adoption when managers and directors control various percentages of the firm. When 
managers and directors control between 10 and 20 percent of the firm, shareholders reap 
large abnormal returns from ESOP adoption. The wealth effects decrease but are still 
positive when managers and directors control less than 10 percent. When they control 40 
percent or more, there are significantly negative abnormal returns from ESOP adoption. 
This result suggests that external investors want to ensure that internal investors 
(managers, directors, and employees) do not acquire too much control via the ESOP. 
 The above studies only examine the announcement-day effects of ESOPs. Faleye, 
Mehrotra and Morck (2005) extend the analysis of wealth effects beyond the adoption 
period and empirically examine the long-term impact of employee-ownership. They find 
that labor-controlled firms deviate from value maximization. In addition, they grow more 
slowly and invest in fewer capital projects relative to other firms. As a result, shareholder 
wealth is reduced for labor-controlled firms. 
 The above studies have examined various aspects of downsizing decisions and 
ESOP adoptions, yet none has specifically differentiated stock price reactions for firms 
that have existing ESOP plans, as this research does. By examining the wealth effects 
associated with downsizing ESOP and non-ESOP firms, this research differs from 
previous studies in that it addresses the effectiveness of employee stock ownership in 
controlling agency problems between employees, managers, and external investors during 
a period of downsizing. Specifically this research determines that the level of downsizing, 
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the existence of an ESOP and the percentage of internal ownership (both managerial and 
employee) are also factors that influence the wealth effects of downsizing. If these factors 
(and their interaction with each other) significantly impact the wealth effects of 
downsizing for an ESOP firm, then it could be an indication of external investors’ 
perception of the impact employee ownership has on the firm. If they believe that 
employee-owners influence the downsizing decision, then investors might value ESOP 
firms differently than non-ESOP firms. This paper explores whether ESOPs lead to 
incentive alignment versus employee entrenchment, in the long run, by proposing and 
testing the hypotheses outlined in the next section. 
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Hypotheses  
 
 Downsizing carries with it a connotation of either positive or negative information. 
 From a positive viewpoint, downsizing can be seen as a mechanism for improving 
productivity, increasing capital- relative to labor-productive resources, or reducing a 
bloated workforce.  Alternatively, the information could be viewed negatively if 
downsizing is interpreted as admitting to loss of market share, as a harbinger of 
obsolescence and need for exit, or as a quick-fix for poor performance and low 
profitability. This ambiguity in the informational content of downsizing causes the wealth 
effects of a downsizing announcement by a firm (Firm i) to be unpredictable, regardless 
the of ESOP status. 
 When the existence of an ESOP plan is incorporated into the analysis, then the wealth 
effects of a downsizing announcement become even more ambiguous. If a firm has an ESOP 
plan, then rational, external investors have an additional layer of information that can be 
analyzed in either a positive or negative way. From a positive perspective, investors might feel 
that the employee-owners have better inside information and, as principals, have worked with 
management to establish the correct level of downsizing. Alternatively, investors might feel that 
the employee-owners have used their ownership powers to manipulate the level of downsizing 
to some sub-optimal level to minimize the number of layoffs and maintain their job security. 
Both of these beliefs are rational and possible, yet they might yield two very different stock 
price reactions for downsizing ESOP firms.  
 Whatever their belief concerning the informational content of the downsizing 
announcement, investors respond to the downsizing decisions of both types of firms—
ESOP and non-ESOP. Extant literature has documented that investors generally view 
layoff decisions negatively (Elayan et al. (1998), Worrell et al. (1991), Chen et al. (2001)). 
However, it is not known whether this is also the case for ESOP firms, because there is 
very little research related to the correlation between downsizing and ESOPs that helps 
untangle the wealth effects inherent in both of these labor-related decisions. 
Notwithstanding the paucity in research, one can intuitively see that the characteristics that 
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ESOPs encourage (presumably long-term value maximization, reward for increased 
productivity, and/or employment longevity) run counter to the premise of downsizing, 
which generally seeks short-term value maximization, discipline for poor productivity, 
and/or reductions in labor. 
 Because the impact of ESOPs has not been previously addressed in the downsizing 
literature, this paper will first determine if there are wealth effects at all. Thus, the first 
hypothesis is simply a test of the status quo that there are no wealth effects associated 
with downsizing.   
 
Hypothesis 1: Regardless of ESOP status, there are no wealth effects associated with 
downsizing. 
 
 The results from testing Hypothesis 1 serve as a basis of comparison with other 
studies that examine the wealth effects of downsizing. This hypothesis makes no 
assumptions regarding the direction or magnitude of abnormal returns and ESOP firms are 
not distinguished from non-ESOP firm. Thus, a finding of no wealth effects should not 
cause concern because it could simply be the case that the stock price reaction of ESOP 
firms is directly opposite to that of non-ESOP firms, thereby yielding an insignificant result 
overall. Of course, a finding of negative wealth effects is consistent with other downsizing 
studies.9  
 Regardless of the outcome from Hypothesis 1, subsequent tests are conducted to 
further examine the impact of ESOPs on downsizing firms. Specifically, the difference in 
wealth effects between ESOP and non-ESOP firms is examined to determine whether 
external investors react differently to the downsizing decisions of the two firm types. 
Assuming that investors use information from the downsizing announcement to update 
their beliefs about the firm, any change in the price of the company’s stock after the 
announcement should indicate how external investors view the layoff decision (Fama, 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
9 Although there is a possibility of finding positive wealth effects (as would be the case when firms ascribe “positive reasons” to their need 
for downsizing), the likelihood of doing so is fairly low in a cross-sectional examination. In any case, the reason for downsizing will be 
controlled for via a regression equation. 
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Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969)).10 A positive stock price reaction might indicate that 
external investors believe that downsizing maximizes the value of the firm, ceteris paribus. 
Alternatively, a negative stock price reaction might indicate that external investors are 
averse to some aspect of the downsizing decision (i.e. the reason, level, or timing of 
downsizing) and therefore value the firm less. Both of these possible reactions could occur 
for downsizing ESOP and non-ESOP firms. However, for ESOP firms, there might be an 
additional factor that impacts the external investor’s valuation of the downsizing decision- 
empowered employee-owners. 
 With the existence of employee-owners within the firm, external investors of 
ESOP firms must also consider the possibility that employees have influence in labor-
related issues (Rosen, Klein and Young (1986)).11 ESOP firms develop a corporate culture 
in which employees have greater employment longevity and are less likely to leave the firm 
(Klein (1987) and Klein and Hall (1988)). There is also a greater degree of cooperation 
and communication between employees and managers (USGAO Study, 1987; Quarrey and 
Rosen, 1986).12 Finally, employee-owners have greater decision-making power as a result 
of the ESOP (National Center for Employee Ownership, 2001). 13 The combination of 
these three factors—the employee-owners’ increased tenure, their cooperative relationship 
with management, and their greater decision-making power—might provide the 
employees of ESOP firms with power to influence labor-related decisions.  
 Any influence that employee-owners have could be due to the unique position that 
they occupy within the ESOP firm: employee-owners have a dual role as both agent (an 
employee subject to unemployment from downsizing) and as principal (a shareholder with 
voting rights that could influence downsizing decisions). This duality of roles might cause 
an internal conflict within employees as they weigh the potential loss of salary/wage 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
10 ESOP participants cannot sell their shares on the market unless they are already retired or are fired; as a result, the wealth effects 
measure only the external investors’ reaction to the downsizing announcement 
11 They find that managers believe ESOP participants have influence on several managerial decisions, including “hiring, firing and 
personnel decisions”. 
12 
Quarry and Rosen (1986) find that ESOP firms sometimes have Employee Participation (EP) programs, in which management and 
workers come together to devise new strategies. 
13 
Depending on the governance rules established during the initial set-up, employees have the ability to direct the ESOP trustee in all 
voting matters, thus giving employees a voice in corporate decisions. 
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income from downsizing against the increased value in the ESOP that accrues to a firm 
that downsizes to the optimal level. Their dual roles can be analyzed from two extremes: 
the employee-as-agent and the employee-as-principal. 
 The risk-averse, employee-as-agent might prefer the current, “certain” wealth from 
salary/wage income to the future, “uncertain” retirement income promised by the ESOP, 
in which case the prospect of downsizing is unpalatable.14  By its very definition, employee 
downsizing results in workforce reductions that often lead to a decrease in employee 
income (Gibbons and Katz, 1991; Gardner, 1993) and loss of employee morale in the 
remaining employees (Brockner, 1988). These negative effects of downsizing are 
completely opposite to the goals of ESOP plans, which are designed to increase 
employment longevity, employee income, and corporate loyalty (National Center for 
Employee Ownership, 2001). As the primary target of layoffs, the employee-as-agent is 
completely averse to any downsizing and prefers no downsizing at all. 
 On the other hand, the employee-as-principal, whose interests are fully aligned 
with the owners, recognizes that maintaining the same level of employment will further 
reduce the value of the firm and could ultimately threaten the firm’s survival, which leads 
to the loss of both salary/wage and the ESOP. If the optimal level of downsizing is 
undertaken, the value of the firm and shareholder’s wealth will be maximized, as will the 
value of the ESOP. Consequently, the employee-as-principal would prefer the optimal 
level of downsizing. 
 These two extremes characterize the environment faced by ESOP participants 
when the firm needs to downsize its workforce. The reality might be that employee-
owners, in a game-theoretic compromise, prefer a downsizing level somewhere in between 
the two extremes: the employee-preferred downsizing level is greater than zero in order to 
ensure the firm’s survival, but less than the optimal level that maximizes the value of the 
firm. This lower level of downsizing is preferred because: (1) it reduces each individual 
employee’s probability of job loss; (2) it marginally improves the performance of the firm 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
14 ESOP participants are able to receive the value of their ESOP shares if laid off, but only the portion that is fully vested. Usually 
distribution must begin no later than the sixth plan year following the year of separation from service, thus adding another delay in benefits 
if laid off (Rodrick and Rosen (1996)). 
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by cutting some of the labor costs, though not by the optimal amount; and (3) it still 
allows future growth of the ESOP’s value, although perhaps at a lower level than if the 
firm had laid off the “correct” number of workers.15 
 If external investors suspect employee-owners of influencing the level of 
downsizing to maximize their own utility, then they might react differently to the 
downsizing decisions of ESOP versus non-ESOP firms, ceteris paribus. To compare the 
wealth effects of downsizing, Hypothesis 2 tests the assumption of no difference between 
the two types of firms. 
 
Hypothesis 2:  There is no difference between the wealth effects associated with 
downsizing ESOP firms versus downsizing non-ESOP firms. 
 
 This hypothesis simply proposes that the market does not distinguish between the 
downsizing decisions of ESOP and non-ESOP firms. By incorporating employee-
ownership into the analysis of downsizing, Hypothesis 2 is used to measure external 
investors’ perception of the downsizing decision. As will be detailed in Section II.5, there 
is a measurable and significant difference between the wealth effects of the two types of 
firms. 
  After determining the difference in the wealth effects of downsizing ESOP versus 
non-ESOP firms, it is necessary to examine what factors impact ESOP firms differently. 
This paper proposes two factors that might cause the wealth effects for ESOP firms to 
differ from the wealth effects of non-ESOP firms—the level of internal (employee and 
managerial) firm ownership and the level of downsizing.  
 The first factor—level of internal ownership—provide a direct measure of the 
potential agency problem that exists between the internal and external investors of an 
ESOP firm. Within ESOP firms, there is often a high level of employee-management 
interaction and cooperation; the very characteristic that ESOPs are designed to encourage. 
However, during periods of economic downturns or poor financial performance, that 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
15 
A future study will examine characteristics of downsized ESOP participants (e.g. vested versus un-vested, senior versus junior 
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cooperation could mutate into a conspiracy whereby employees and managers collude to 
maintain their job security. Indeed, Gamble (2000) finds that with higher percentages of 
employee ownership, management tends to make decisions that are less risky and serve to 
entrench the manager. Managers of ESOP firms also view employees as friendly votes in 
matters related to corporate control. Thus, the “ensnared” managers of ESOP firms are 
unlikely to institute major downsizing activities that could alienate a potential base of 
support.16 
 The second factor—level of downsizing—is closely tied to the level of internal 
ownership. Workers who were once simply agents of the external shareholders are now, 
to a limited degree, internal shareholders of the company with many of the voting rights 
and responsibilities that ownership entails. When faced with a challenge to their 
employment longevity and income, “empowered” ESOP employees might focus more on 
securing their salary/wage through continued employment and use their ownership power 
to create an environment in which downsizing is unlikely or is instituted at a lower-than-
optimal level. In a climate of corporate downsizing, the long-term strategic thinking that 
ESOPs are designed to encourage might be supplanted by short-term job-preservation 
instincts if employees act to reduce the level of downsizing. This potential for a lower 
level of downsizing represents a divergence from the optimal level of downsizing and 
might indicate employee entrenchment. When a sub-optimal level of downsizing is 
instituted, it could reduce the value of the firm, thereby expropriating value from external 
investors to internal workers. 
 The impact of these two factors on the wealth effects will be examined by testing 
Hypotheses 3 through 6, respectively. Hypothesis 3 looks at the role of internal ownership 
in determining stock price reactions while Hypotheses 4-6 examine whether there is 
interaction between employee-owners, managers, and/or the level of downsizing that 
influences wealth effects. If both the “ensnared” manager and “empowered” employees of 
                                                                                                                                            
employees, etc.) 
16 The possibility of managerial entrenchment necessitates an examination of how employee-percentage owned affects productivity and 
performance. This is covered in the second essay. 
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 the ESOP firm act to restrict downsizing activity, then ESOP firms might choose a sub-
optimal level of downsizing that could lead to lower wealth effects for ESOP firms when 
compared to non-ESOP firms.17 Alternatively, if the internal owners (agents) of the firm 
are perceived as working in the best interests of the corporation, then the wealth effects 
will be greater, ceteris paribus. The hypotheses are: 
 
Hypothesis 3: The percentage of employee ownership has no influence on the wealth 
effect of ESOP companies versus non-ESOP companies. 
 
Hypothesis 4: There is no interaction between the level of downsizing and the level of 
managerial ownership that influences the wealth effects of ESOP 
companies versus non-ESOP companies. 
 
Hypothesis 5: There is no interaction between the level of downsizing and the level of 
employee ownership that influences the wealth effects of ESOP companies. 
 
Hypothesis 6: There is no interaction between the level of employee ownership and the 
level of managerial ownership that influences the wealth effects of ESOP 
companies. 
 
 Hypothesis 3 examines how the magnitude of employee ownership impacts the 
wealth effects of the downsizing company. As the level of employee ownership increases, 
employees should ideally become more like principles and seek to maximize the value of 
the firm, even during a climate of downsizing. If such is the case, there should be a 
positive impact. Alternatively, if employees of ESOP firms exploit their ownership powers 
to their own advantage, there might be a perception of employee entrenchment that could 
manifest itself in negative wealth effects. 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
17 Just as Kraft (1991) found that profit-sharing firms have a lower number of employee dismissals, there is also a possibility that ESOP 
plans lead to a decreased level of downsizing. 
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 Hypotheses 4-6 look at possible interaction between employees, managers and the 
level of downsizing. Hypothesis 4 examines whether there is interaction between 
managerial ownership and the level of downsizing that influences the wealth effect of the 
downsizing firm. If external shareholders believe that managers make value-maximizing 
downsizing decisions regardless of the ESOP status of the firm, then the interaction 
parameter estimate will be positive. Thus, for a given level of managerial ownership, 
higher levels of downsizing will result in more positive wealth effects. 
 Hypothesis 5 examines the possibility that the presence of employee-owners 
influence the level of downsizing, which in turn influences the wealth effects of the 
downsizing firm. If employee-owners value their salary/wage income more than firm 
ownership, they might try to use their ownership “powers” to reduce the percentage of 
workers laid off so that ESOP firms have lower downsizing levels than non-ESOP firms, 
ceteris paribus. External investors, noting the relatively low downsizing level when 
comparing it to industry competitors, might respond negatively to small layoffs within 
ESOP firms if they believe employees are entrenched in the firm.18 
 Hypothesis 6 examines the possibility of collusion between managers and 
employee-owners against external investors. If external investors feel that the “insiders” of 
ESOP firms (i.e. managers and employees) have worked together to alter the optimal level 
of downsizing, then ESOP firms might be valued lower than non-ESOP firms, ceteris 
paribus. Alternatively, if external investors feel that stock ownership encourages both 
managers and employees to act more like principals and to set the “correct” downsizing 
level, then ESOP firms might be valued higher or the same as non-ESOP firms. 
 Based on the results from testing these hypotheses, the comparison of wealth 
effects between ESOP and non-ESOP firms provides insight into the agency problems that 
are associated with downsizing decisions. If external investors believe that there is 
collusion between employee-owners and managers, then higher levels of internal 
ownership (i.e. ESOP and managerial ownership) could increase the agency problem and 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
18 Normally, large layoffs cause negative abnormal returns. But if large layoffs are positive here, it could mean that external investors 
more strongly approve of the larger layoff because they believe the firm is too “bloated” with workers. 
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 lead to a more negative stock price reaction for downsizing announcements. 
Alternatively, if external investors believe that internal investors act more like principals to 
maximize the value of the firm even in the face of potential job loss, then the agency 
problem has been reduced and downsizing decisions should be accompanied by more 
positive stock price reactions.  
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Methodology and Data 
 
To test for the wealth effects of downsizing announcements, standard market 
model event-study methodology is used (Fama et al, (1969) and Brown and Warner, 
(1985)). The standard market model is a statistical model that relates a security’s return to 
the return on a market portfolio such as the CRSP Value Weighted Index or the CRSP 
Equal Weighted Index. The model has a linear specification and assumes that the asset 
returns are independent and identically distributed with a jointly, multivariate normal 
distribution through time (MacKinlay, 1997).  
The market model is a preferred methodology because it removes the portion of 
the stock’s return that is related to the variation in the market, thereby reducing the 
variance of the abnormal return estimates. As a result, the model is better able to detect 
event effects related to downsizing. The estimation equation is given below:  
Rit = αi + βiRmt + εit       (1) 
where Rit is the rate of return on common stock for Firm i on Day t, Rmt is the rate of 
return on an equally- or value-weighted portfolio and εit is a random term assumed to be 
i.i.d~N(0,σ2).  
 The parameter estimates from the market model, ai and bi, are then used to 
calculate announcement period abnormal returns for each company. Abnormal returns are 
defined as the difference between actual returns and predicted returns: 
ARit =  Rit  -ai - biRmt       (2) 
 The average abnormal return is simply the sample mean, defined below:  
 ∑
=
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/N      (3) 
Finally, the average abnormal returns are summed across time for the two-day event 
period, t = -1,0 to yield cumulative average abnormal returns, CAARt 
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 Although standard event-study methodology is a time-honored technique for 
gauging the wealth effects associated with various events, it does have inherent 
limitations. One limitation is the first order, serial dependence in the abnormal returns. 
Another problem is the unknown value for the variance of the abnormal returns. To adjust 
for these violations in statistical assumptions, corrections must be made. To correct the 
problem of serial dependence, the length of the estimation window must be sufficiently 
large (greater than 100 days) to take advantage of asymptotic properties; for this study, 
the market model uses data from a 255 trading-day estimation period ending 46 trading 
days before the event date. To address the problem of unknown variance, the sample 
variance from the market model regression will be substituted. One further modification is 
to standardize each abnormal return using an estimator of its standard deviation. 
According to Patell (1976), this standardization leads to more powerful tests.  
After the CAARs are estimated, they are first tested for significance, regardless of 
ESOP status. Next, they are tested for differences between ESOP and non-ESOP firms. 
Finally, the CAARs act as the dependent variable and are regressed against the 
independent variables believed to impact the abnormal returns using Weighted Least 
Squares (WLS) regression, where the weight is the variance of the abnormal return. 
 The data used to conduct the OLS regression are composed of downsizing events 
for a testing period which covers the 10-year span from 1990-1999.19  A downsizing firm 
is defined as a company that announces a decision to lay off a portion of its workforce; an 
ESOP firm is defined as a company that has an employee stock ownership plan in place 
that adheres to the requirements established under ERISA of 1974.  To isolate the effect 
of the announcement, the downsizing firm should have no previous layoffs at least three 
years prior to the “current” announcement and no subsequent layoffs for at least three 
years after the “current” announcement.20 Finally, no other announcement can be made in 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
19 The time period was chosen to incorporate and/or reduce any distortions that would accompany the 1986 change in tax laws.   
20 Because layoff decisions can be made more than once during the life cycle of a corporation, a company cannot be excluded from 
research consideration for having multiple layoff instances as long as those instances are sufficiently spaced apart. Three-year spans were 
chosen to ensure that the fiscal year end data on Compustat did not overlap with any other downsizing activity for the same firm. 
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conjunction with the downsizing decision, as this might cloud the effects of the layoff 
itself. 
 In addition to the above requirements, the company must make its downsizing 
announcement through some verifiable public medium (e.g. Wall Street Journal) and the 
financial/accounting information of the company must be available on COMPUSTAT for 
the entire testing period. To analyze the stock price reaction, stock price information for 
the downsizing companies must be available on CRSP for at least three years before the 
announcement date. Table 1 provides the descriptions of variables that are used to 
examine the effects of ESOPs and downsizing on shareholder’s wealth. 
These variables capture firm-specific attributes of the downsizing firm. However, 
because downsizing can be cyclical to some degree and companies within an industry face 
similar market challenges, the market conditions must be extracted from firm-specific data to 
capture the response to layoffs. The 2-digit industry code is used to classify firms into 
industries.21 The descriptive statistics and frequency tables are shown in Table 2 and Table 3, 
respectively. 
 As depicted in Table 2, the cumulative average abnormal return, CAAR, for all 
firms (N=718), is negative (-0.01752). 22 However, ESOP firms have positive average 
abnormal return (0.00042) whereas non-ESOP firms have a negative average abnormal 
return (-0.02380). The table also shows that non-ESOP firms have a significantly higher 
level of downsizing, DS, (11.61 percent) as compared to ESOP firms (6.97 percent). With 
respect to firm size, MKTVAL, downsizing ESOP firms have an average market value of 
$9.9 billion with an average of 2.16 segments, SEGS, per firm whereas downsizing non-
ESOP firms tend to be smaller with an average market value of $3.1 billion and an average 
of 1.50 segments per firm. Finally, the managerial ownership, MGR_OWN, is greater for 
non-ESOP firms (13.18 percent) versus ESOP firms (4.63 percent); institutional 
ownership, INST_OWN, is also greater (18.71 percent for non-ESOP firms versus 11.84 
percent for ESOP firms). However, for ESOP firms, when employee ownership, ESOP, 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
21 Table 28 in the Appendix lists the 2-digit industry codes of firms included in the sample. Table 29 shows the yearly breakdown of 
downsizing firms included in the sample.  
22 Test statistics are shown only for the difference in means column.  
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(8.06 percent) is added to managerial ownership (4.63 percent), there is no significant 
difference between the total percentage of internal ownerships for ESOP firms (12.69 
percent) versus that of non-ESOP firms (13.18 percent). These descriptive statistics are 
comparable to extant research (Elayan et al., (1998); Worrell et al., (1991); Lin and 
Rozeff, (1987)), which finds a negative abnormal return for downsizing firms. 
 Table 3 shows the frequency distribution of the qualitative variables. For 
downsizing reason, the most prevalent reason cited is to cut expenses; the least cited 
reason is to improve technology. With respect to merger/acquisition activity, a larger 
percentage of non-ESOP firms (15.86 percent) had merger activity within a 2-year span of 
the downsizing announcement when compared to ESOP firms (9.89 percent). Finally, a 
larger percentage of ESOP firms (26.37 percent) were unionized versus non-ESOP firms 
(18.84 percent). 
In Table 4, the downsizing firms are divided into quintiles based on the CAARs. 
The highest quintile (Q5) is compared to the lowest quintile (Q1) for all downsizing firms 
(N = 718) as well as for the sub-groups: non-ESOPs (N = 536) and ESOPs (N = 182). 
The quintile analysis shows that non-ESOP firms have more variability in their abnormal 
returns with an average range of -0.1439 in the lowest quintile to 0.0853 in the highest 
quintile. ESOPs, on the other hand, have a smaller range of abnormal returns from -0.1019 
in the lowest quintile to 0.0649 in the highest quintile.  
This higher degree of variability in the CAARs of non-ESOP firms might indicate 
that more information is conveyed to investors of non-ESOP firms during downsizing 
activity, as external investors adjust their beliefs about the prospects of the firm. The lower 
degree of variability in abnormal returns for ESOP firms might be due to a higher level of 
communication between internal and external shareholders so that some of the downsizing 
information is already encapsulated in the stock price prior to the announcement. In other 
words, ESOPs might play a role in reducing asymmetry problems between internal and 
external shareholders, which means that the “bright side” of ESOPs is present during 
downsizing events. The ambiguity over which “side” is dominant necessitates the 
regression analysis that is conducted in the next section. 
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Regression Equations and Results 
 
 To test Hypothesis 1 for the existence of wealth effects regardless of ESOP status, 
the first regression equation uses the following specification:  
 
CAARit = α0 + β1DSit + β2 MGR_OWNit + β3INST_OWNit + β4LNMVit 
β5HERFit + β6SEGSit + β7UNIONit + β8MERGEit +  
β9CPit + β10ITit + β11CXit + β12DDit + β13IPit + β14REit + εit    (5) 
 
where CAARit is the cumulative average abnormal return over the 2-day period, t = 0 to t 
= 1.23 The quantitative variables of interest include DSit, the percentage of the workforce 
that will be laid off per the downsizing announcement; MGR_OWNit, which measures the 
managerial ownership of the firm; and INST_OWNit, which measures the institutional 
ownership of the firm. Quantitative control variables are also included, such as LNMV, 
HERF, and SEGS. LNMVit is calculated as the natural log of the firm’s market value, 
HERFit measures the degree of industry concentration and competitiveness, and SEGSit is 
a measure of the firm’s diversification.  
Finally, the qualitative variables are added to the model and they include UNIONit, 
which measures the impact of unionization on the downsizing firm; and MERGEit, which 
examines the effect of merger/acquisition activity that occurs within two years of the 
downsizing announcement. The last six qualitative variables measure the reason for 
downsizing as determined by the announcement. The reasons include close plant (CPit), 
improve technology (ITit), cut expenses (CXit) declining demand (DDit), improve 
technology (IPit), and restructuring/reorganizing (REit). Those downsizing firms that do 
not give a reason are classified as NA, which serves as the base level of the qualitative 
variable for downsizing reason. Note that the ESOP variable is not included because this 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
23 I also examined the 3-day time period t = -1 to t = 1; there was no evidence of abnormal returns for that time period. This may be an 
indication that there was very little information leakage prior to the downsizing announcement. 
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equation is testing for the wealth effects of downsizing, regardless of ESOP status. (For 
ease of exposition, the subscripts will be omitted from this point forward.) 24 
Table 5 reports the least-squares estimates of Equation (5). Based on the multiple 
regression results, there is evidence that downsizing decisions lead to negative CAARs 
and as the level of downsizing increases, abnormal returns become even more negative.  
Furthermore, the existence of institutional owners exerts a positive impact on the wealth 
effects of the downsizing firm, as do the size of the firm and the presence of a union. 
Finally, with respect to downsizing reasons, declining demand has a significantly negative 
influence on the wealth effects of the firm whereas improving technology, cutting expenses 
and restructuring all lead to positive abnormal returns. These findings are consistent with 
extant research (Elayan et al., (1998); Worrel et al., (1991)) that shows negative wealth 
effects for downsizing firms and bolster the contention that downsizing generally has a 
negative impact on the firm. 
 Although the results are consistent with other researchers, the difference in this 
study centers on the inclusion of employee ownership as an explanatory factor in the 
wealth effects of downsizing. Specifically, this study examines the role that employee 
ownership has on the firm, as perceived by external investors and if those investors value 
downsizing decisions differently for ESOP versus non-ESOP firms. After measuring the 
wealth effects associated with downsizing for firms in general, the following regression 
equation will be used to test Hypothesis 2 for differences in the wealth effects of ESOP 
versus non-ESOP firms: 
 
CAARit = α0 + β1DSit + β2ESOPit + β3 MGR_OWNit + β4INST_OWNit + β5LNMVit 
β6HERFit + β7SEGSit + β8UNIONit + β9MERGEit +  
β10CPit + β11ITit + β12CXit + β13DDit + β14IPit + β15REit + εit    (6) 
 
The variables in Equation (6) are the same as described in Equation (5), with the 
exception of ESOP, which enters Equation (6) as a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
24 I assume that if firms give no reason for downsizing, it is perceived negatively by investors. Otherwise, managers would give positive 
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has an ESOP and 0 otherwise. This specification measures whether the mere existence of 
an ESOP within the firm affects the abnormal returns. 
In addition to testing for the straightforward effects of ESOP via the ESOP 
dummy variable, it is necessary to examine how the percentage of employee-ownership 
impacts the wealth effects of the downsizing firm. By examining how wealth effects 
change as the percentage of the ESOP increases, this study provides greater insight into 
external investors’ perceptions of the influence that employee ownership has on 
downsizing firms. Table 6 shows the regression results for both specifications of Equation 
(6); ESOP as a qualitative variable and as the numerical percentage of employee 
ownership. 
Note that with the inclusion of the ESOP dummy variable, the parameter estimates 
are not much different than those from the estimation of Equation (5). However, with the 
inclusion of the ESOP dummy, the “Improve Technology” reason for downsizing becomes 
less significant. Of interest in this equation is the sign on the ESOP parameter estimate; it 
is positive when ESOP is included as a dummy variable and when it is expressed as the 
percentage of employee ownership. This indicates that downsizing firms with an ESOP 
plan in place will experience more positive (or less negative) wealth effects than non-
ESOP firms; that is, the abnormal returns of an ESOP firm are an average of 1.12 percent 
higher than the abnormal returns of non-ESOP firms.  
Analyzing the effect that ESOPs have on abnormal returns, it is evident that 
ESOPs have some impact on the wealth effects of the firm.25 As the percentage of 
employee ownership increase, the wealth effects of the firm increase by 9.32 percent. 
However, the level of significance is somewhat low; ESOP is only significant at the 15 
percent level using a two-tailed test. 
With respect to the other control variables included in the regression, institutional 
ownership, market value of the firm and unionization lead to positive abnormal returns for 
downsizing firms. As for the reason for downsizing, cutting expenses and restructuring 
                                                                                                                                            
reasons. 
25 From this point forward, all analysis on employee ownership is based on the quantitative measure of ESOP instead of the qualitative 
ESOP dummy variable 
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have a positive effect whereas declining demand causes negative wealth effects. Again, 
these results are consistent with extant research. 
Regression results show that ESOPs slightly affect abnormal returns. It is now 
time to address the possibility that there might be interaction between employee-owners 
and managerial owners that also impacts the wealth effects of the firm. Hypotheses 4-6 
test for interaction between ESOPs, downsizing and/or managerial ownership.  
 To test Hypotheses 4-6, the following equation is estimated: 
 
CAARit = α0 + β1DSit + β2ESOPit + β3 MGR_OWNit + β4INST_OWNit + β5LNMVit + 
 β6EAGEit + β7ESOPit*DSit + β8MOit*DSit + β9ESOPit*MOit + 
β10HERFit + β11SEGSit +β12UNIONit + β13MERGEit +  
  β14CPit + β15ITit + β16CXit + β17DDit + β18IPit + β19REit  + 
 β20DSit2 + β21ESOPit2 + β22MOit2 + β23EAGEit2 + εi     (7) 
 
The main variables of interest in this equation are DS, ESOP, MGR_OWN, ESOP_AGE, 
ESOP*DS, MO*DS and ESOP*MO.26 They capture, either directly or through 
interaction, the effect that employee stock ownership has on the downsizing firm. The first 
two variables (DS and ESOP) along with the interaction variable (ESOP*DS), measures 
the impact that downsizing and employee ownership have on the wealth effects of the 
firm. The interaction term ESOP*DS will be evaluated for various levels of ownership—
that is, less than 5, between 5 and 10 percent and greater than 10 percent levels of 
ownership. If the interaction variable is significant, then it could be an indication of how 
external shareholders perceive the impact of employee-owners on the level of downsizing. 
 To capture the possibility of collusion, the variables MGR_OWN, MO*DS and 
ESOP*MO are included. Based on Hallock’s (1998) research that managers receive 
monetary benefits from downsizing, the MO*DS variable should capture interaction 
between the level of managerial ownership and the level of downsizing. In addition, 
                                                                                                                                            
  
26
 “MO” stands for Managerial Ownership 
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Gamble’s (2000) research documenting the non-pecuniary benefits that accrue to 
managers of ESOP firms necessitates the inclusion of the interaction term, ESOP*MO. 
The sign on the interaction terms indicate whether external investors believe collusion 
exists between employees and managers that positively or negatively impacts wealth 
effects. 
 EAGE serves as a proxy for the degree of sophistication or learning curve that 
employee-owners have acquired. Firms that have older ESOP plans might also have 
employees with longer employment tenure, greater influence over managers, more 
knowledge of corporate information, and greater awareness of the powers afforded by the 
ESOP. Thus, firms with older ESOP plans could have a greater incidence of employee 
entrenchment, which will be valued negatively by external investors. 
 Variables are added to control for firm-specific attributes that might cloud the 
effect of ESOPs. They include INST_OWN, HERF, SEGS, LNMV, and the reasons for 
downsizing. The Herfindahl index, as measured by HERF, captures the level of 
competitiveness in a particular industry and proxies for the firm’s market power. For 
highly competitive industries, layoffs could occur at a higher rate as companies alter their 
variable costs (i.e. labor) to maintain profitability and maximize firm value.  
 As described earlier, the downsizing reasons are used to distinguish between 
“positive” reasons (IP=Improve Productivity, IT=Improve Technology, CX=Cut 
Expenses, RE=Restructuring) and “negative” reasons (DD=Declining Demand, CP=Close 
Plant). Based on the research of Palmon et al., (1997) and Chen et al., (2001), these 
variables are included to control for downsizing reasons given by management.  
 SEGS is used to measure the extent to which corporate diversification (i.e. 
conglomerates) affects the wealth effects of downsizing firms. Chen et al. (2001) and 
Scott and Ueng (1996) find that downsizing decisions that narrow the focus of the firm 
have more favorable (i.e. less negative) wealth effects.  
 The variable, LNMV, controls for the size of the firm. Larger firms might be better 
able to withstand market downturns. Thus, they could have lower levels of downsizing, 
ceteris paribus, than smaller firms which might lead to less negative wealth effects.  
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 Finally, to control for curvilinear effects, squared terms are included in the 
equation for DS2, ESOP2, MO2 and EAGE2. By including second-order variables, the 
model is better able to capture decreasing or increasing marginal effects of downsizing, 
employee ownership, managerial ownership, and the age of the ESOP.  
 These variables, when included in the regression equation used to analyze the 
wealth effects of downsizing, provide insight into the question of how employee stock 
ownership impacts the downsizing decisions of the firm. The significance of these 
variables in explaining the variation in the stock price reaction of downsizing firms 
contribute to a better understanding of the agency problems that exist within the firm.  
 The results from estimating Equation (7) on the full sample (N=718) of downsizing 
firms are shown in Table 7. Two different models are analyzed; the full model includes 
both interaction and curvilinear effects whereas the reduced model has only the interaction 
effect. In the full model, the squared terms are highly insignificant and could distort the 
estimation for the other variables. After the squared terms are excluded, there is evidence 
of a significantly negative downsizing effect (DS = -0.11009; t-statistic = -2.87). In 
addition, institutional ownership, market value, unionization, technology improvements, 
reduction of expenses, and corporate restructuring all have a significantly positive impact 
on wealth effects, whereas declining demand has a negative effect.  
While Table 7 details the negative impact of downsizing (in the reduced model), 
the parameter estimates on the ESOP-related variables and their interaction are not as 
significant, with the exception of ESOP*MO. The parameter estimate for this interaction 
variable is significantly positive (ESOP*MO = 1.01860; t-statistic = 1.86), causing 
Hypothesis 6 to be rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis that there is interaction 
between employee- and managerial-ownership that positively influences abnormal returns. 
However, the lack of significance on the other ESOP-related variables could be due to the 
use of the full sample in estimating Equation (7) without controlling for different 
characteristics of the data set. Thus, it is necessary to re-estimate Equation (7) on several 
different sub-samples of the data.27 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
27 None of the squared terms in Equation (7) is significant for the sub-samples of the data and therefore, are not included in the results. 
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The data are divided based on the following criteria: (1) level of downsizing; (2) 
age of ESOP plan; (3) Tobin’s Q; and (4) ESOP status. For the first criteria, level of 
downsizing, the data are divided into two groups: low downsizing level (DS < 5 percent) 
and high downsizing level (DS > 5 percent). The results from the regression are shown in 
Table 8. 
There are 281 low-downsizing firms and 437 high-downsizing firms; however 
since the regression results for low-downsizing are not very significant, I will focus on 
firms with high levels of downsizing. Table 8 shows that firms with high levels of 
downsizing have more negative wealth effects (DS = -0.16405; t-statistic = -3.07). This 
result is consistent with existing research, as is the negative impact of declining demand 
(DD = -0.04097; t-statistic = -2.75). The positive impact of firm size, institutional owners, 
unionization, and restructuring have also been documented in the literature (Palmon et al., 
(1997); Lin and Rozeff, (1987)).  
As for the ESOP-related variables, ESOP has a negative effect on abnormal 
returns when downsizing levels are high (ESOP = -0.36046; t-statistic = -1.56), but the 
result is only significant at the 15 percent level. There is also evidence that employee-
ownership interacts with managerial ownership to positively impact wealth effects 
(ESOP*MO = 2.81756; t-statistic = 2.84). Thus when the interaction effect is analyzed in 
conjunction with the straight effects of ESOP, the net result is positive impact on 
abnormal returns. In other words, the “bright side” of ESOPs is manifested in high 
downsizing levels as employees and managers work together to improve shareholder 
wealth. 
Table 9 shows the regression results estimating Equation (7) for the 182 ESOP-
only firms that are divided based on the age of the ESOP (EAGE). Firms with ESOP plans 
older than 10 years (EAGE > 10) are defined as older ESOP plans; newer plans have been 
in existence for less than 10 years (EAGE < 10) prior to the event date. These criteria 
yielded 82 older plans and 100 newer plans.  
The results in Table 9 show that ESOP participants negatively interact with 
downsizing decisions, regardless of plan age—ESOP*DS is equal to -2.53 and -3.51 for 
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older and newer plans, respectively and is significant at the 1 percent level. However, 
firms with older plans have significantly positive interaction between managerial 
ownership and downsizing (MO*DS = 5.60895; t-statistic = 3.88) whereas firms with 
newer plans have significantly negative interaction between managerial ownership and 
downsizing (MO*DS = -3.97967; t-statistic = -3.20). This result could mean that 
employees of both older and newer ESOP plans have some degree of entrenchment or 
resistance to downsizing but firms with newer plans are perceived more negatively by 
external investors than firms with older plans. In other words, firms with older ESOP 
plans have higher abnormal returns, thus indicating that managers’ incentives are more 
aligned with external investors.  
In Table 10, the data are divided into two groups based on Tobin’s Q. Because 
some observations have missing values on Compustat, only 418 downsizing firm are 
included in the regression. The firms are separated into high Q (Q > 1.0) and low Q (Q < 
1.0) firms.28 This separation yields 165 high-Q and 253 low-Q firms; however the 
regression results are not very significant for either sub-group. None of the ESOP-related 
variables is significant in either regression. This result might be due to the fact that 
downsizing firms typically have low-Q values during the event year so that there is very 
little difference between the two sub-groups. However, Tobin’s Q will be more thoroughly 
analyzed in the Essay 2, which uses 5-year panel data to assess the impact of downsizing 
on the long-term financial performance of the firm. 
The final sub-sample analysis is based on ESOP status. All 718 downsizing firms 
are divided into ESOP (N=182) and non-ESOP (N=536) sub-samples. The results from 
estimating the full and reduced models on both the ESOP and non-ESOP sub-samples are 
shown in Table 11.29 
Upon examining Table 11, is is clear that the curvilinear variables are not very 
significant, except for EAGE2 in the full ESOP model.30 As a result, analysis is conducted 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
28 The data was also divided based on Q levels greater or less than 1.25 and Q levels greater or less than 1.5. The results were the same. 
29 Of course, for non-ESOP firms, Equation (7) will not include any of the ESOP-related variables. 
30 The positive sign on EAGE means that the age of the ESOP has a positive impact on the wealth effects of the downsizing firm. 
However, the negative sign on EAGE2 indicates that the effect increases at a decreasing rate. 
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on only the reduced models for both ESOP and non-ESOP firms. Note that the parameter 
estimate for downsizing is positive but has only a 15 percent level of significance for 
ESOP firms (DS = 0.07292; t-statistic = 1.55); however downsizing is significantly 
negative for non-ESOP firms (DS = -0.10777; t-statistic = -3.01), indicating that external 
investors view downsizing activity in ESOP firms more favorably than downsizing in non-
ESOP firms.  
 With respect to the other quantitative control variables in the reduced models, 
institutional ownership loses some of its significance for ESOP models, yet it still has a 
positive impact on wealth effects for non-ESOP models. This result is comparable to other 
research (Park and Song, 1995) and is an indication that institutional owners play an 
important monitoring role. Neither HERF nor SEGS contribute any explanatory power to 
the model, however, the natural log of the firm’s market value (LNMV) has a significantly 
positive influence on wealth effects for both ESOP and non-ESOP firms. This suggests 
that external investors respond more positively to the downsizing decisions of larger firms 
who might be perceived as being bloated with employees.  
As for the qualitative variables, UNION is significantly positive for ESOP firms, 
however it has little explanatory power for non-ESOP firms. MERGE is insignificant for 
both the ESOP and non-ESOP models. For downsizing reasons, only plant closings (CP), 
cutting expenses (CX) and restructuring (RE) are significantly positive for ESOP firms 
while improving technology (IT), cutting expenses (CX), and restructuring (RE) are 
significantly positive for non-ESOP firms. Declining demand (DD) is significantly 
negative, but only for non-ESOP firms. Again, these results are in line with what previous 
researchers have found (Chen et al., (2001); Palmon et al., (1997)). 
 Of the interaction variables tested in this model, only MO*DS is significantly 
negative for ESOP firms. Thus, there is evidence to reject Hypothesis 5 for ESOP firms in 
favor of the alternative that there is interaction between the percentage of managerial 
ownership and the level of downsizing. In other words, for a given percentage of 
managerial ownership, as the level of downsizing increases, the wealth effects become 
even more negative. This finding indicates that external investors view downsizing 
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decisions more negatively in firms with larger shares of managerial ownership, thereby 
lending some support to Hallock’s (AER, 1998) study, which shows that managers of 
downsizing firms are more likely to be dismissed from the company following a layoff. 
 As for the other interaction variables in this model, ESOP*DS and ESOP*MO 
(which are used to test Hypothesis 4 and Hypothesis 6, respectively), they become 
significant when the ESOP firms are analyzed for various levels of employee ownership. 
Specifically, the 182 ESOP firms are divided into three sub-groups where the percentage 
held in the ESOP is less than 5% (N=73 firms), between 5% and 10% (N=60 firms) and 
greater than 10% (N=49 firms). The summary statistics and frequency tables for the three 
levels of employee ownership are shown in Tables 12, 13, and 14, respectively. 
 Table 12 shows the differences between ESOP firms with different levels of 
employee ownership. Firms with less employee ownership tend to be larger (see 
MKTVAL) and more competitive (see HERF) than firms with greater employee 
ownership. There is also evidence that, as the level of employee ownership increases from 
less than 5 percent to greater than 10 percent, managerial ownership (MGR_OWN) and 
institutional ownership (INST_OWN) have a U-shape, whereas diversification (SEGS) has 
an inverted U-shape. This indicates that medium levels of employee ownership have the 
potential to dominate managerial and institutional ownership in diversified firms and might 
therefore have a louder voice in the corporate governance of the firm. With respect to the 
variables of interest in this study, note that the abnormal returns (CAARs) increase from 
negative to positive returns as the percentage of employee ownership increases. This 
suggests that firms with higher levels of employee ownership have positive wealth effects 
which could mean that there is better incentive alignment between employee-owners and 
investors. 
 Table 13 compares the difference in means of the quantitative variables for the 
different levels of employee ownership. There is significant difference between the ESOP 
levels for all three sub-samples. Furthermore, there is significant difference between low- 
and medium-ESOPs for downsizing, managerial ownership, and institutional ownership 
indicating that low-ESOP firms have higher levels than medium-ESOP firms for these 
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quantitative variables. As for low- versus high-ESOP levels, low-ESOP firms have 
significantly higher levels of downsizing. There are very few differences between medium- 
versus high-ESOP levels of ownership. 
 Table 14 depicts the frequency of the qualitative variables. No discernable patterns 
are evident in the qualitative variables, with the exception of unionization. Unionization is 
much more prevalent in ESOP firms with low (ESOP<5%) and high (ESOP>10%) 
employee ownership, but it is almost equally divided in firms with medium (5% ≤ ESOP ≤ 
10%) employee ownership. This increased prevalence of unionization in medium-ESOP 
firms coupled with the fact that medium-ESOP employees hold a larger percentage of the 
firm than institutions and managers may indicate that employees in medium-ESOP firms 
wield considerable power. 
 To test Hypotheses 4-6 for ESOP firms only, Equation (7) is analyzed for the three 
different levels of employee ownership.31 The results from estimating Equation (7) for 
each ESOP level are shown in Table 15. For low-ESOP firms, downsizing (DS = .25811; 
t-statistic = 2.03) and ESOPs (ESOP = 0.90416; t-statistic = 1.64) have a positive effect 
on abnormal returns, yet there is negative interaction between employee ownership and 
downsizing (ESOP*DS = -7.42621; t-statistic = -1.78). This suggests that for a given level 
of ESOP, as downsizing increases, there is a negative effect on abnormal returns.  
 For medium-ESOP firms, there is evidence of positive interaction between managers 
and employee-owners (ESOP*MO = 17.44354; t-statistic = 2.90). However, the positive 
interaction is mitigated by the fact that ESOPs (ESOP = -6.42544; t-statistic = -2.40) and 
managerial ownership (MGR_OWN = -1.29385; t-statistic =-2.58) individually have a negative 
impact. In other words, for a given level of employee ownership, wealth effects increase as the 
managerial ownership increases. The net positive interaction between ESOPs and managerial 
ownership suggests that external investors believe managers—perhaps in conjunction with 
institutional investors (INST_OWN = 0.06660; t-statistic = 2.49)—keep medium-ESOP 
employees in check. 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
31 For each level of ownership the full model, including interaction and squared terms, was estimated. However, because not all squared 
terms were significant, I re-estimated the regression equation for each level of ESOP, including only those squared terms that were 
significant. The final results are shown in Table 15.  
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 As for high-ESOP firms, few of the independent variables are significant, with the 
exception of unionization (UNION = 0.04952; t-statistic = 2.75) and the interaction between 
employee ownership and downsizing (ESOP*DS = -4.47433; t-statistic = -2.00). The 
significance of these two variables might indicate that there is entrenchment within high-ESOP 
firms, as perceived by investors; however that potential entrenchment does not translate into 
lower wealth effects.  If external investors believe the downsizing level is incorrect, the 
downsizing announcement should yield negative returns, however the opposite reaction occurs; 
high-ESOP firms have a low level of downsizing as well as positive abnormal returns.  
 The results from the preceding analysis provide a complex picture of the wealth 
effects associated with downsizing. On one hand, ESOP firms have significantly less 
negative abnormal returns than non-ESOP firms and in some cases actually have positive 
abnormal returns. However, there does seem to be evidence of entrenchment, particularly 
for medium- and high-ESOP firms. 
Despite the finding of significantly positive interaction between managerial ownership 
and downsizing for ESOP firms in general, there is no evidence of significant interaction within 
the different levels of ESOP. Perhaps the separation of the ESOP firms into three groups 
reduces the explanatory power of the interaction variable, MO*DS.  Nevertheless, there is 
sufficient evidence to reject each of the interaction hypotheses, whether for ESOP firms in 
general or for different levels of ESOP percentages. 
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Summary and Conclusion 
 
 Finance, economic, and management literature documents the negative wealth 
effects that often accompany downsizing decisions. However, previous research has failed 
to take into consideration the impact that employee ownership has on the abnormal returns 
of downsizing firms. This study fills that empirical void. Given that Employee Stock 
Ownership Plans (ESOPs) are used to improve the agency relationship between 
employees, managers, and shareholders, and that downsizing decisions are often at odds 
with the objectives of ESOPs, a relevant question concerning the role of employee-
ownership arises when ESOP firms engage in downsizing activity. More specifically: Is 
there evidence that ESOP firms have different wealth effects associated with downsizing 
decisions than non-ESOP firms? 
Using downsizing as the catalyst to which the market reacts, this paper examines 
the wealth effects that accompany downsizing announcements to determine whether 
external investors interpret layoff decisions of ESOP firms differently from non-ESOP 
firms. When comparing the difference in means between ESOP and non-ESOP firms, there 
is a significant difference between the two types of firms for all quantitative variables 
except HERF. Thus, for the CAARs estimate, ESOP firms are significantly less negative 
than non-ESOP firms. There is also evidence that the level of downsizing for non-ESOP 
firms is significantly higher than ESOP firms. This result is the first indication that the 
employee-owners of ESOP firms could be entrenched. This lower level of downsizing 
coupled with a significantly negative parameter estimates for the ESOP variable would be 
an indication that the “dark side” of ESOPs exists.  
I find that when downsizing firms are not separated based on ESOP status, there is 
a significantly negative wealth effect, which is consistent with extant research (Chen et al., 
(2001); Park and Song, (1995)). However, when ESOP is included there is some evidence 
that ESOPs have a significant positive impact on the abnormal returns, but it is only for 
newer ESOP plans that are less than ten years old. Even when the data are divided into 
sub-groups based on downsizing level, ESOP age, and Tobin’s Q, the ESOP variable 
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contributes very little to the analysis of wealth effects. 
 When the entire data sample is divided into ESOP and non-ESOP firms, there is 
evidence that downsizing leads to small, marginally significant (at the 15 percent level) 
positive wealth effects for ESOP firms, yet non-ESOP firms have larger, highly significant 
negative wealth effects. Because the negative abnormal returns associated with non-ESOP 
companies outweigh the positive abnormal returns of ESOP firms, the negative wealth 
effects often documented in existing research is easily explained. 
 With respect to the interaction between ESOPs, managerial ownership and/or 
downsizing, there is evidence of negative interaction between managerial ownership and 
downsizing for ESOP firms, but not for non-ESOP firms. Additionally, when ESOP firms 
are divided by levels of employee ownership into low (ESOP < 5 percent), medium (5 
percent ≤ ESOP ≤ 10 percent) and high (ESOP > 10 percent) ESOP levels, there is 
evidence of negative interaction between ESOP and downsizing, but only for low and high 
ESOP levels. There is also evidence of positive interaction between ESOP and managerial 
ownership, but only for medium ESOP levels.  
 The other explanatory variables that impact the wealth effects of the firm include 
the age of the ESOP. As the age of the ESOP increases, it exerts a positive influence on 
the wealth effects of the firm. Additionally, greater institutional ownership and firm size 
lead to positive abnormal returns for the downsizing firm. 
 These findings of significant interaction for various levels of employee ownership 
show that external investors are highly aware of the role that employee-owners play in the 
downsizing decisions of the firm and that they use this knowledge when evaluating the 
downsizing decisions. And since ESOP participants are prevented from selling their shares 
until after retirement or dismissal, the stock price reaction provides clearer insight into 
external investors’ reaction to downsizing. For the most part, external investors view 
employee ownership positively, yet there is some indication that external investors believe 
employee-owners are entrenched in the firm, especially for high levels of employee 
ownership.  
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 The implication for investors is that the “bright side” of employee ownership 
marginally overcomes the “dark side” so that downsizing decisions do not hurt the ESOP 
firms as much as non-ESOP firms. When institutional shareholders are added to the 
equation, they increase the wealth effects of downsizing firms even more, especially for 
medium-ESOP firms where institutional investors serve as a monitoring force. 
 However, this study is limited by its conditional nature—that is, it examines wealth 
effects conditional on the firm’s downsizing decision. To make causal statements 
regarding the impact that downsizing decisions have on the wealth effects, an extension of 
this research will examine the downsizing decision itself; specifically, what factors are used 
by managers in making the decision to lay off a portion of the workforce. By performing a 
two-stage regression that uses a logistical equation to model the manager’s downsizing 
decision, the potential selectivity bias is mitigated and the event study results will be more 
robust. 
 Another extension will be to examine if there is a difference between employee 
stock ownership via a 401(k) plan versus stock ownership in an ESOP. Like ESOPs, 
participants in a 401(k) plan also have voting rights. However, there is no centralized 
organization through which employees can network with each other and with 
management. There is also no board representation by employees with 401(k) stock 
ownership. Thus, their level of influence could be less than that of ESOP employees. If 
downsizing decisions differ for the two types of employee owners, it will provide 
additional insight into the agency problem and corporate governance issues of ESOP 
firms. 
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Table 1. Description of Variables Used in Wealth Effects Regression 
This table presents information on the independent variables used in the regression equations. It 
describes how each variable is calculated and the reason for inclusion. 
 
Variables, Xi Description of Variable Reason for Inclusion 
CAAR Cumulative Average Abnormal Return Dependent variable for regressions. 
DS Percentage of workers laid off. Equals 
number of employees laid off divided 
by the total workforce. 
Measures the impact that downsizing 
has on the firm. (Chen et al., 2001; 
Elayan et al., 1998; Kraft, 1991) 
ESOP Percentage of the firm held by 
employees in qualified ESOP plan;  
 
Measures the impact of employee 
ownership on wealth effects. (Klein, 
1987; Klein and Hall, 1988) 
MGR_OWN Percentage of the firm held by upper 
management. Calculated as shares held 
plus value of fully exercised options. 
Measures the impact of managerial 
ownership on wealth effects . (Gamble, 
2000; Hallock, 1998) 
INST_OWN Percentage of the firm held by 
institutional investors  
Measures the impact of institutional 
ownership on wealth effects. 
EAGE Dummy variable; 0 for non-ESOP 
firms; t+1 for each year the ESOP has 
been in existence. 
Measures ESOP age; proxy for ESOP 
participants’ level of organization. 
(Kumbhaker and Dunbar, 1993) 
HERF Squared sum of the market share of 
each firm, i, within 2-digit industry, j. 
Controls for market leader effect and 
level of competition. (Chen et al, 2001) 
SEGS Number of Business Segments Controls for level of diversification. 
(Scott and Ueng, 1996) 
MKTVAL Firm’s Market Value; the natural log 
of market value used in regression. 
Controls for firm size. (Jones and Kato, 
1995) 
DS_REAS Dummy variables; equals 1 for each 
respective reason, 0 if no reason given. 
Control for positive/negative reason for 
downsizing. (Palmon, et al, 1997) 
UNION Dummy Variable; equals 1 if firm is 
unionized, 0 otherwise 
Controls for unionization. 
MERGE Dummy Variable; equals 1 if firm had 
merger  within 2 year span, 0 otherwise 
Controls for Merger/Acquisition 
activity. 
ESOP*DS ESOP percentage multiplied by level of 
downsizing. 
Measures interaction between ESOP 
and downsizing. Proxy for agency 
problem. (Kraft, 1991) 
MO*DS Managerial ownership multiplied by 
level of downsizing. 
Measures interaction between manager 
ownership and downsizing. Proxy for 
agency problem. (Kraft, 1991) 
ESOP*MO ESOP percentage multiplied by 
managerial ownership. 
Measures collusion between employees 
and managers. Proxy for agency 
problem. (Gamble, 2000) 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics: Means (Standard Deviations) 
This table presents descriptive statistics on the 718 downsizing firms from 1990-1999 included in 
the final sample. The “Difference in Means” column tests the null hypothesis that ESOP firms are 
equal to non-ESOP firms for each independent variable shown. 
 
Variables All 
Non-
ESOPs ESOPs  
Difference 
in Means
CAAR -0.01766 
(0.08661) 
-0.02380 
(0.09521) 
0.00042 
(0.04980) 
 -0.02422 
(0.00553) 
*** 
DS 0.10432 
(0.11827) 
0.11609 
(0.12360) 
0.06968 
(0.09294) 
 0.04641 
(0.00872) 
*** 
ESOP N/A  N/A 0.08063 
(0.07660) 
 N/A N/A 
EAGE N/A  N/A 12.73077 
(9.26223) 
 N/A N/A 
MGR_OWN 0.11015 
(0.17024) 
0.13183 
(0.18527) 
0.04629 
(0.08863) 
 0.08554 
(0.01035) 
*** 
INST_OWN 0.16566 
(0.18583) 
0.18171 
(0.19364) 
0.11841 
(0.15147) 
 0.06330 
(0.01400) 
*** 
SEGS 1.66435 
(1.34554) 
1.49627 
(1.12573) 
2.15934 
(1.75955) 
 -0.66307 
(0.13919) 
*** 
HERF 0.08102 
(0.07838) 
0.08296 
(0.07488) 
0.07532 
(0.08787) 
 0.00764 
(0.00727) 
 
MKTVAL 
($, Millions) 
4,849.21 
(10,936.40) 
3,133.82 
(7,932.30) 
9,902.37 
(15,929.50) 
 -6,768.55 
(1,229.48) 
*** 
Number of 
Observations 
718 536 182   
*** Significant at the 0.01 level 
 ** Significant at the 0.05 level 
   * Significant at the 0.10 level 
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Table 5. Regression Estimates for Equation (5) 
This table contains multiple regression estimates for firms that announced layoffs in 
the period 1990-1999. The dependent variable is the 2-day abnormal return, CAAR. 
Abnormal return is calculated using the value-weighted CRSP index over the 2-day 
period, t = -1, 0. Days are measured relative to the Wall Street Journal announcement 
date, t = 0. The t-statistics (in parentheses) test the null hypothesis that the 
independent variable is equal to 0. 
Variable Name Parameter Estimate t-statistic  
Intercept -0.14773 (-4.07) *** 
DS -0.08868 (-3.04) *** 
MGR_OWN 0.01534 (0.78)  
INST_OWN 0.03002 (1.74) * 
LNMV 0.00625 (3.75) *** 
HERF 0.05592 (-1.40)  
SEGS -0.00081 (-0.32)  
UNION 0.01588 (2.02) ** 
MERGE 0.00732 (0.82)  
CP 0.00743 (0.76)  
IT 0.04456 (1.65) * 
CX 0.02253 (2.48) ** 
DD -0.02321 (-2.33) ** 
IP -0.00040 (-0.02)  
RE 0.02474 (2.54) ** 
R2 = 0.0962                                F-Value = 5.35*** 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level 
 ** Significant at the 0.05 level 
   * Significant at the 0.10 level 
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Table 6. Regression Estimates for Equation (6) 
This table contains multiple regression estimates for firms that announced layoffs in the 
period 1990-1999. The dependent variable is the 2-day abnormal return, CAAR. Abnormal 
return is calculated using the value-weighted CRSP index over the 2-day period, t = -1, 0. 
Days are measured relative to the Wall Street Journal announcement date, t = 0. The t-
statistics (in parentheses) test the null hypothesis that the independent variable is equal to 
0. 
 Qualitative ESOP Variable  Quantitative ESOP Variable  
Variables 
Parameter 
Estimate t-statistic  
Parameter 
Estimate t-statistic  
Intercept -0.14016 (-3.83) *** -0.14476 (-3.99) *** 
DS -0.08753 (-3.01) *** -0.08616 (-2.96) *** 
ESOP 0.01123 (1.43)  0.09317 (1.51)  
MGR_OWN 0.01875 (0.95)  0.01771 (0.90)  
INST_OWN 0.03268 (1.89) * 0.03179 (1.84) * 
LNMV 0.00572 (3.35) *** 0.00599 (3.58) *** 
HERF -0.05434 (-1.36)  -0.05511 (-1.38)  
SEGS -0.00118 (-0.46)  -0.00098 (-0.39)  
UNION 0.01534 (1.95) ** 0.01542 (1.97) ** 
MERGE 0.00824 (0.92)  0.00795 (0.89)  
CP 0.00828 (0.85)  0.00747 (0.77)  
IT 0.04284 (1.59)  0.04295 (1.59)  
CX 0.02208 (2.43) ** 0.02136 (2.35) ** 
DD -0.02276 (-2.29) ** -0.02326 (-2.34) ** 
IP -0.00148 (-0.08)  -0.00145 (-0.08)  
RE 0.02429 (2.50) ** 0.02471 (2.54) ** 
                      R2 = 0.0989      F-Value = 5.13***           R2 = 0.0992    F-Value = 5.15***    
                      
*** Significant at the 0.01 level                 
 ** Significant at the 0.05 level                   
   * Significant at the 0.10 level                    
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Table 7. Regression Estimates for Equation (7) 
This table contains multiple regression estimates for firms that announced layoffs in the 
period 1990-1999. The dependent variable is the 2-day abnormal return, CAAR. Abnormal 
return is calculated using the value-weighted CRSP index over the 2-day period, t = -1, 0. 
Days are measured relative to the Wall Street Journal announcement date, t = 0. The t-
statistics (in parentheses) test the null hypothesis that the independent variable is equal to 0. 
 Full Model Reduced Model  
Variables 
Parameter 
Estimate t-statistic
Parameter 
Estimate t-statistic  
Intercept -0.14814 (-3.76) *** -0.13844 (-3.77) *** 
DS -0.04003 (-0.61)  -0.11009 (-2.87) *** 
ESOP 0.03457 (0.17)  -0.04143 (-0.43)  
EAGE 0.00061 (0.43)  0.00025 (0.45)  
MGR_OWN -0.04486 (-0.74)  -0.00462 (-0.16)  
INST_OWN 0.03624 (2.05) ** 0.03217 (1.86) * 
LNMV 0.00603 (3.40) *** 0.00578 (3.41) *** 
HERF -0.04834 (-1.36)  -0.05411 (-1.35)  
SEGS -0.00086 (-0.33)  -0.00098 (-0.38)  
UNION 0.01575 (1.99) ** 0.01586 (2.02) ** 
MERGE 0.00855 (0.95)  0.00771 (0.86)  
CP 0.00948 (0.97)  0.00918 (0.94)  
IT 0.04868 (1.78) * 0.04653 (1.72) * 
CX 0.02209 (2.41) ** 0.02256 (2.47) ** 
DD -0.02079 (-2.06) ** -0.02175 (-2.18) ** 
IP 0.00016 (0.01)  -0.02175 (-0.01)  
RE 0.02408 (2.45) ** 0.02462 (2.51) ** 
ESOP*DS 0.50506 (0.55)  0.77080 (0.87)  
MO*DS 0.17502 (1.06)  0.13013 (0.81)  
ESOP*MO 1.14150 (2.02) ** 1.01860 (1.86) * 
DS2 -0.12458 (-1.30)    
ESOP2 -0.30153 (-0.46)    
EAGE2 -0.00001 (-0.37)    
MO2 0.05338 (0.67)    
                   R2 = 0.0989      F-Value = 5.13***              R2 = 0.0992      F-Value = 5.15***  
*** Significant at the 0.01 level                 
 ** Significant at the 0.05 level                   
   * Significant at the 0.10 level                    
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Table 8. Regression Estimates of Equation (7): Low versus High Downsizing Level 
This table contains multiple regression estimates for the final sample of 718 firms that 
announced layoffs in the period 1990-1999. The sample is divided based on downsizing 
level. High downsizing levels are for downsizing (DS) greater than 5 percent (438 firms); 
low downsizing levels are for DS less than 5 percent (281 firms). The dependent variable is 
the 2-day abnormal return, CAAR. Abnormal return is calculated using the value-weighted 
CRSP index over the 2-day period, t = -1, 0. Days are measured relative to the Wall Street 
Journal announcement date, t = 0. The t-statistics (in parentheses) test the null hypothesis 
that the independent variable is equal to 0. 
 
Low Downsizing Level 
 (281 Firms) 
High Downsizing Level  
(437 Firms)  
Variables 
Parameter 
Estimate t-statistic
Parameter 
Estimate t-statistic  
Intercept -0.16417 (-3.35) *** -0.12385 (-2.39) ** 
DS 0.17981 (0.60)  -0.16405 (-3.07) *** 
ESOP 0.15028 (1.24)  -0.36046 (-1.56)  
EAGE -0.00006 (-0.13)  0.00019 (0.16)  
MGR_OWN 0.05284 (1.05)  -0.04502 (-1.02)  
INST_OWN 0.00327 (-0.16)  0.04719 (1.92) * 
LNMV 0.00701 (3.27) *** 0.00550 (2.22) *** 
HERF -0.01633 (-0.40)  -0.11107 (-1.71)  
SEGS -0.00256 (-1.13)  0.00280 (0.54)  
UNION 0.00822 (1.06)  0.02538 (1.92) * 
MERGE 0.00157 (-0.15)  0.01618 (1.21)  
CP 0.00084 (-0.08)  0.01294 (0.86)  
IT 0.04983 (2.02) ** 0.02478 (0.51)  
CX 0.00654 (0.60)  0.02876 (2.17) ** 
DD -0.00197 (-0.18)  -0.04097 (-2.75) *** 
IP 0.01141 (-0.56)  0.00802 (0.27)  
RE 0.01293 (1.12)  0.02623 (1.87) * 
ESOP*DS -1.42456 (-0.35)  1.64544 (1.16)  
MO*DS -1.53977 (-0.84)  0.28289 (1.29)  
ESOP*MO -0.35735 (-0.66)  2.81756 (2.84) *** 
                   R2 = 0.0878      F-Value = 1.32                 R2 = 0.1400      F-Value = 3.57***  
*** Significant at the 0.01 level                 
 ** Significant at the 0.05 level                   
   * Significant at the 0.10 level                    
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Table 9. Regression Estimates of Equation (7): Older versus Newer ESOP Plans 
This table contains multiple regression estimates for the final sample of 182 ESOP firms 
that announced layoffs in the period 1990-1999. The sample is divided based on age of the 
ESOP plan. Older ESOP plans are for ESOP age (EAGE) greater than 10 years; newer 
ESOP plans are for EAGE less than 10. The dependent variable is the 2-day abnormal 
return, CAAR. Abnormal return is calculated using the value-weighted CRSP index over the 
2-day period, t = -1, 0. Days are measured relative to the Wall Street Journal announcement 
date, t = 0. The t-statistics (in parentheses) test the null hypothesis that the independent 
variable is equal to 0. 
 Older ESOP Plans (82) Newer ESOP Plans (100)  
Variables 
Parameter 
Estimate t-statistic
Parameter 
Estimate t-statistic  
Intercept 0.01379 (0.12)  -0.19901 (-3.54) *** 
DS 0.02372 (0.31)  0.31764 (3.19) *** 
ESOP 0.01543 (0.15)  0.19553 (1.84) * 
EAGE -0.00013 (-0.17)  0.00163 (1.09)  
MGR_OWN -0.09940 (-0.68)  0.28352 (2.31) ** 
INST_OWN -0.06014 (-1.38)  0.02120 (0.78)  
LNMV -0.00119 (-0.24)  0.00714 (2.94) *** 
HERF -0.00304 (-0.06)  -0.01850 (-0.25)  
SEGS 0.00079 (0.23)  -0.00340 (-1.01)  
UNION 0.02221 (1.54)  0.01583 (1.77) * 
MERGE 0.00189 (0.10)  0.02316 (1.42)  
CP 0.03434 (1.53)  0.02011 (1.47)  
IT 0.02568 (0.80)  0.01649 (0.59)  
CX 0.03278 (1.90) * 0.01177 (1.05)  
DD 0.00307 (0.16)  -0.00354 (-0.25)  
IP 0.02164 (0.85)  -0.00248 (-0.11)  
RE 0.02550 (1.39)  0.01285 (1.06)  
ESOP*DS -2.52905 (-2.59) ** -3.51074 (-2.11) ** 
MO*DS 5.60895 (3.88) *** -3.97967 (-3.20) *** 
ESOP*MO 0.15577 (0.23)  1.12084 (1.34)  
                   R2 = 0.4063      F-Value = 2.23***              R2 = 0.4259      F-Value = 3.12***  
*** Significant at the 0.01 level                 
 ** Significant at the 0.05 level                   
   * Significant at the 0.10 level                    
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Table 10. Regression Estimates of Equation (7): High Q versus Low Q Firms 
This table contains multiple regression estimates for the final sample of 418 firms that 
announced layoffs in the period 1990-1999. Of the 718 total firms in the original sample, 
only 418 firms had complete information for calculating Tobin’s Q based on Compustat and 
CRSP data availability. The sample is divided based on Tobin’s Q. High Q firms are those 
with Tobin’s Q (Q) greater than 1; low Q firms are those with Q less than 1. The dependent 
variable is the 2-day abnormal return, CAAR. Abnormal return is calculated using the value-
weighted CRSP index over the 2-day period, t = -1, 0. Days are measured relative to the 
Wall Street Journal announcement date, t = 0. The t-statistics (in parentheses) test the null 
hypothesis that the independent variable is equal to 0. 
 High Q Firms (165) Low Q Firms (253)  
Variables 
Parameter 
Estimate t-statistic
Parameter 
Estimate t-statistic  
Intercept -0.09955 (-0.86)  -0.27198 (-3.97) *** 
DS -0.09271 (-0.96)  -0.05743 (-0.56)  
ESOP -0.09946 (-0.33)  0.01365 (0.09)  
EAGE 0.00026 (0.16)  -0.00018 (-0.17)  
MGR_OWN 0.09986 (1.36)  0.07838 (1.35)  
INST_OWN -0.01873 (-0.41)  0.05377 (1.65) * 
LNMV 0.00396 (0.75)  0.01314 (3.72) *** 
Q -0.00399 (-0.55)  -0.03437 (-1.39)  
HERF -0.02324 (-0.26)  -0.01774 (-0.26)  
SEGS 0.00234 (0.42)  -0.00122 (-0.26)  
UNION 0.01531 (0.77)  0.00905 (0.69)  
MERGE 0.02321 (1.21)  -0.02434 (-1.20)  
CP 0.01526 (0.66)  -0.00644 (-0.37)  
IT 0.06940 (1.39)  -0.01628 (-0.19)  
CX 0.02091 (0.87)  0.03067 (1.94) * 
DD -0.06808 (-2.84) *** -0.01076 (-0.65)  
IP -0.00449 (-0.11)  0.01560 (0.43)  
RE 0.02516 (1.07)  0.00781 (0.44)  
ESOP*DS 1.76492 (0.42)  1.19444 (0.78)  
MO*DS 0.13105 (0.25)  -0.22312 (-0.59)  
ESOP*MO -0.31580 (-0.29)  -0.31162 (-0.11)  
                   R2 = 0.1560      F-Value = 1.33                  R2 = 0.1287      F-Value = 1.72**  
*** Significant at the 0.01 level                 
 ** Significant at the 0.05 level                   
   * Significant at the 0.10 level                    
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Table 12. Summary Statistics: Means (Standard Deviations) for Various ESOP Levels 
This table shows descriptive statistics for the independent variables used in the regression equations. 
The sample consists of 182 downsizing ESOP companies from 1990-1999. The ESOP firms are 
divided into three levels: Low Employee Ownership (ESOP < 5 percent); Medium Employee 
Ownership (5 percent < ESOP < 10 percent) and High Employee Ownership (ESOP > 10 percent). 
Three-way testing for difference in means is shown in Table 13. 
 
Variables 
Low Employee 
Ownership 
Medium Employee 
Ownership 
High Employee 
Ownership 
CAAR -0.0006 
(0.0377) 
-0.0004 
(0.0389) 
0.0029 
(0.0731) 
DS 0.0886 
(0.1234) 
0.0558 
(0.0152) 
0.0585 
(0.0663) 
ESOP 0.0202 
(0.0137) 
0.0738 
(0.0152) 
0.1790 
(0.0780) 
EAGE 11.4932 
(8.64761) 
12.5167 
(9.5872) 
14.8367 
(9.5620) 
MGR_OWN 0.0554 
(0.0981) 
0.0319 
(0.0450) 
0.0504 
(0.1109) 
INST_OWN 0.1412 
(0.1727) 
0.0895 
(0.1372) 
0.1199 
(0.1296) 
SEGS 2.0548 
(1.9068) 
2.5333 
(1.8546) 
1.8571 
(1.3070) 
HERF 0.07413 
(0.10695) 
0.0726 
(0.0718) 
0.0804 
(0.0747) 
MKTVAL  
($, Millions) 
11,334.1640 
(14,244.5600) 
9,775.2010 
(14,405.5060) 
7,925.0030 
(19,755.4970) 
Number of 
Observations 
73 60 49 
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Table 13. Difference in Means Testing (Standard Errors) for Various ESOP Levels 
This table shows three-way testing (low versus medium, medium versus high and low versus high) 
for difference in means. The sample consists of 182 downsizing ESOP companies from 1990-1999. 
The ESOP firms are divided into three levels: Low Employee Ownership (ESOP < 5 percent); 
Medium Employee Ownership (5 percent < ESOP < 10 percent) and High Employee Ownership 
(ESOP > 10 percent). The Mean Difference columns test the null hypothesis of no difference in mean 
for the various levels of employee ownership for each independent variable shown. 
 
 
Variables 
Mean Difference: 
Low versus Medium
 Mean Difference: 
Medium versus High 
 Mean Difference: 
Low versus High 
 
CAAR -0.0002 
(0.0051) 
 0.0025 
(0.0105) 
 0.0023 
(0.0105) 
 
DS -0.0328 
(0.0079) 
*** 0.0027 
(0.0095) 
 -0.0301 
(0.0096) 
*** 
ESOP 0.0536 
(0.0020) 
*** 0.1052 
(0.0111) 
*** 0.1588 
(0.0111) 
*** 
EAGE 1.0235 
(1.2434) 
 2.3201 
(1.3753) 
* 3.3436 
(1.3711) 
** 
MGR_OWN -0.0234 
(0.0060) 
*** 0.0184 
(0.0159) 
 -0.0050 
(0.0159) 
 
INST_OWN -0.0516 
(0.0179) 
*** 0.0303 
(0.0187) 
 -0.0213 
(0.0187) 
 
SEGS 0.4785 
(0.2409) 
** -0.6762 
(0.1893) 
*** -0.1977 
(0.1885) 
 
HERF -0.0015 
(0.0094) 
 0.0078 
(0.0107) 
 0.0063 
(0.0108) 
 
MKTVAL  
($, Millions) 
-1,558.9630 
(1,869.9520) 
 -1,850.1980 
(2,832.4080) 
 -3,409.1610 
(2,828.9520) 
 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level                 
 ** Significant at the 0.05 level                   
   * Significant at the 0.10 level                    
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Chapter Three 
 
Essay 2: Productivity and Performance Effects of Downsizing 
 
Introduction 
 
 Economic and finance theories postulate that the firm is actually a nexus of 
contracts between the shareholders, managers, and employees of the firm. Within this 
nexus of contracts, the responsibilities of the manager to the shareholders and of the 
employees to the manager are explicitly defined via employment compensation contracts. 
In general, the principals (shareholders) delegate decision-making authority to appointed 
agents (board of directors and managers) who, in turn, engage more agents (employees) to 
produce goods and services. For their efforts, the manager and employees receive 
compensation that should ideally maximize their utility, while shareholders receive a 
normal rate of return on their investment. Game theory suggests that, absent any market 
imperfections, these corporate players have a cooperative strategy that, in equilibrium, will 
settle on the optimal choice of employee productivity, production output, and corporate 
returns. 
 However, imperfections do exist within the market that often result in a deviation 
from the optimal choice of productivity, output, and corporate returns. Two such market 
imperfections are asymmetric information, where only the employees know their own level 
of self-motivation and productive talents (Spence, 1973), and agency problems where 
employees, who have an inherent disutility for exerting effort, engage in shirking behavior 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The combination of these (and other) market imperfections 
often leads to corporate decisions in which productivity, output, and/or corporate returns 
are no longer maximized.  
To counteract the reality of imperfect markets and their detrimental effect on the 
value of the firm, shareholders are motivated to devise a compensation contract that will 
provide employees with an incentive to exert a higher level of effort. While there are many 
incentive contracts that provide direct remuneration for increased productivity (e.g. profit 
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sharing, efficiency wages), Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that the ideal incentive 
contract should include an element of firm ownership. By incorporating firm ownership 
into the incentive contract, Jensen and Meckling propose that employees turned owners 
will decrease shirking behavior and increase their individual and collective productivity to 
receive a portion of the residual income that normally accrues to external 
shareholders/upper management.  
One such contract that incorporates firm ownership is the Employee Stock 
Ownership Plan (ESOP). Under an ESOP plan, a percentage of the firm’s outstanding 
shares are set aside and allocated to each individual employee’s retirement account based 
on his or her annual compensation. By establishing an ESOP plan, the managers/investors 
of the firm make a conscious commitment to focus on job security and firm ownership as 
motivating forces for increased productivity and greater financial performance. 
Consequently, employees who were once simply agents of the firm are now partial owners 
(i.e., principals) with an incentive to exert more effort and shirk less, thereby reducing 
agency costs, increasing productivity, and maximizing the value of the firm. Indeed 
empirical studies show that ESOP companies have higher employee productivity 
(Kumbhaker and Dunbar, 1993; Jones and Kato, 1995) and improved operating 
performance (Pugh, Oswald and Jahera, 2000) when compared to non-ESOP firms.  
Yet the benefits of ESOP plans are not restricted to the increased productivity and 
financial performance of the firm. Perhaps just as important is the corporate culture that 
ESOP plans engender. Within ESOP firms, employee-owners work together with 
managers to reduce production costs, improve the efficiency of the firm, and formulate 
solutions that increase firm value. In fact, empirical studies show that ESOP employees 
exhibit greater job satisfaction (Klein and Hall, 1988), demonstrate greater corporate 
loyalty (Klein, 1987), and have a decreased rate of employee turnover (Perun, 2000). In 
addition, ESOP employees closely monitor co-workers (Fitzroy and Kraft, 1987) and 
participate in more of the firm’s strategic decision-making (Rooney, 1992).  These 
intangible consequences of ESOPs embodied within the corporate culture of the firm 
provide employees with both extrinsic benefits (e.g., financial rewards and firm 
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ownership), as well as intrinsic benefits (e.g., job satisfaction, corporate loyalty, and 
employment tenure) that help reduce the agency problem between employees and 
shareholders. 
 However, the agency problems that ESOPs successfully address might resurface 
over time as ESOP employees acquire a higher percentage of the firm and greater input 
into the firm’s decisionmaking. Given their dual role as both shareholders (principals) and 
employees (agents), employee-owners could use their increased power to entrench 
themselves within the firm. This potentially negative outcome exposes the “dark side” of 
ESOPs and brings into question the ability of ESOP firms to withstand market challenges 
(such as decreased demand) that require employee layoffs.  
 As ESOP companies go through natural business cycles and corporate life cycles, 
the long-term thinking that ESOPs are designed to encourage runs headlong into the 
volatility that accompanies corporate profitability, shifts in product demand, and changing 
competitive environments. And because downsizing is often a natural response to these 
occurrences, ESOP firms might need to make labor decisions that run counter to the 
objectives of employee ownership. Specifically, firms must weigh the necessity of 
downsizing against the “promise” of job security implied by the ESOP. Thus, in some 
respects, the decision to downsize is one that pits the manager against the employees of 
the company. 
However, because ESOP employees are also shareholders of the firm, they have a 
degree of power not held by regular employees in non-ESOP firms. Given their employee-
owner status, they could respond as either a principal or an agent to the downsizing 
decision. If ESOP employees act more like principals, then they might be more accepting 
of downsizing decisions that maximize the value of the firm. They might be less likely to 
entrench themselves in the firm and instead, are willing to downsize at the optimal level 
despite their potential job loss. Furthermore, after downsizing, the productivity levels of 
these “principal-acting” employees could remain high, which leads to better financial 
performance. Thus, in this scenario, managers are able to engage in downsizing activity 
without negatively impacting the productivity and financial performance of the firm, 
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because the incentives of employee-owners are fully aligned with those of shareholders 
and the ESOP has reduced the agency problems of the firm. This scenario delineates the 
“bright side” of ESOPs. 
Alternatively, ESOP employees might act more like agents who attempt to 
entrench themselves within the firm when faced with the prospect of downsizing. If the 
benefits of ESOPs, such as longer employee tenure and corporate loyalty, are threatened 
by the premise of downsizing, which seeks reductions in labor and leads to employee 
distrust, then employee-owners might create a corporate culture that “ensnares” 
management and discourages them from engaging in layoffs (Gamble, 2000). As a result, 
ESOPs could cause the unintended and undesirable effect of limiting downsizing activity 
within the ESOP firm, even when downsizing is necessary. If entrenched employees and 
“ensnared” managers collude to set a sub-optimal downsizing level, then the productivity 
and financial performance of the firm will suffer. This potential “dark side” of ESOPs 
provides the basis for the analysis contained in this paper. 
 Assuming that downsizing is the value-maximizing decision for the firm, this paper 
will determine if the productivity and financial performance of ESOP firms differ from that 
of non-ESOP firms after downsizing. If ESOP firms exhibit better productivity and 
financial performance after downsizing, ceteris paribus, then it might be an indication that 
ESOP firms are better able to recover from the negative effects of downsizing and that the 
presence of employee-owners is beneficial to the firm. Alternatively, if ESOP firms have 
lower productivity and/or financial performance after downsizing, ceteris paribus, then it 
might mean that downsizing decisions more negatively affect ESOP firms and the ESOP is 
detrimental to the firm when downsizing is necessary.  
 In this study, I find that productivity increases for downsizing firms, in general, but 
when the sample is divided into ESOP versus non-ESOP companies, the non-ESOP firms 
show significantly greater improvement in productivity. ESOP firms have a small increase 
in productivity, however the increase is much lower than it is for non-ESOPs and it begins 
to sink back to pre-downsizing levels within two years. Further, the productivity of ESOP 
firms is less than that of non-ESOP firms in both the pre- and post-downsizing period, 
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which could be an indication that the employees of the ESOP firms are entrenched. 
Finally, I show that there is positive interaction between managerial ownership and 
downsizing that increases the productivity of the firm, but only for non-ESOPs. 
 With respect to financial performance, I find that downsizing has a negative effect 
on the firm, in general, yet the performance improves markedly during the post-
downsizing period. The improvement is much greater for non-ESOP firms than for ESOP 
firms. In addition, I find that ESOP firms have lower Q-measures in both the pre- and 
post-downsizing period when compared to non-ESOPs. Finally, I show that there is 
positive interaction between the level of managerial ownership and the level of employee 
ownership for ESOP companies that increases the financial performance of the firms. 
However the increase in financial performance for ESOP companies is still lower than the 
increase for non-ESOPs. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II.2 discusses the 
relevant literature on the effect that downsizing has on the productivity and financial 
performance of the firm. In Section II.3, hypotheses are developed that examine the 
productivity and financial performance of ESOP versus non-ESOP firms before and after 
downsizing. The methodologies for testing both the productivity and performance of the 
downsizing firm are outlined in Section II.4 along with a description of the data and 
regression variables. In Section II.5, regression equations used to measure the change in 
productivity and performance are provided as well as the results from estimation. Finally, 
Section II.6 contains the summary and conclusions from the study. 
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Related Literature 
 
A. Downsizing Literature 
 
 The ability to alter employment levels has long been a tool utilized by corporate 
managers. In the short run, labor is the most adjustable factor of production, therefore it 
provides flexibility for managing the production costs of the firm. By decreasing the 
number of workers, the firm is able to realize labor cost savings that allow it to withstand 
periods of decreased demand or to improve profitability (Jensen, 1993). In addition, 
layoffs (or the credible threat of layoffs) also serve as an incentive for workers to improve 
productivity (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1983; Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984; Kraft, 1991). Thus, 
downsizing decisions fulfill many objectives for the firm—from increasing corporate 
returns to motivating unproductive workers. 
However, layoff decisions do not go forth without very human consequences. 
When the managers of a firm decide to downsize to generate labor cost savings or 
improve productivity, they often do so regardless of the personal effect that downsizing 
has on the employee. Thus, an unanticipated result might be that risk-averse workers 
respond negatively to the decreased job security and potential loss of income from 
unemployment. Indeed, studies show that lower-level managers/workers experience 
feelings of guilt and anger as well as a decrease in morale and corporate loyalty after 
downsizing (Brockner, 1988). Furthermore, after workers are laid off, the remaining 
workers experience longer work hours and increased levels of stress (Fisher, 1992). 
Employees become more risk-averse in making company decisions, they sometimes cheat 
on company reports to make their performance look better, or they might even sue the 
company (Boroughs, 1992).  
Given the negative employee response to layoffs, downsizing could adversely 
affect the productivity and financial performance of the firm, thereby negating the labor 
cost savings and incentive effects from downsizing. This negative response might be even 
more pronounced in ESOP firms, where employees have a more cooperative relationship 
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with management and where they often feel a sense of entitlement to job security 
(Mallory, 1991). However, ESOP firms are not immune to the vagaries of economic 
business cycles. They, too, need to alter their workforce on occasion. When that need 
arises, the job security of employee-owners is just as threatened and uncertain as the job 
security of employees in non-ESOP firms.  
 Although the employees of ESOP and non-ESOP firms face similar threats to 
employment in a climate of downsizing, the employee’s response might differ between the two 
firm types. However, extant research has only examined the productivity and financial 
performance effects on downsizing firms, in general, without controlling for the ESOP status of 
the firm. For example, Cappelli (2000) finds that productivity (as measured by sales/employee) 
decreases after downsizing, especially for firms that are operating at or above capacity. 
However, he does not distinguish between firms that have employee stock ownership plans and 
those that do not. 
 In another study, Kraft (1991) examines the incentive effects of dismissals, 
efficiency wages, piece-rates, and profit sharing on the productivity of workers. He finds 
that dismissals have an effect on productivity that is non-linear; that is, productivity first 
increases and then decreases as employees become more fearful of their own potential job 
loss. In addition, he finds that dismissals (or at least the credible threat of dismissals) serve 
a dual purpose. They reduce losses caused by employees whose marginal productivity is 
below the wage rate, and they effectively motivate the remaining workers to be more 
productive. 
 From a financial performance perspective, DeMeuse, Vanderheiden, and Bergmann 
(1994), examine the profit margins, ROA, and ROE of companies that announced downsizing 
decisions from 1987-1991. Contrary to expectations, they find that financial performance, as 
measured by these indicators, worsened in the two years following downsizing. Similarly, 
Cascio, Young, and Morris (1997) examine ROA and ROE for downsizing firms two years 
after the announcement for the period 1980 to 1994. They report that firms that engage in pure 
employment downsizing do not realize significantly higher returns. 
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 Downs (1995) looks at the effect of downsizing on employees. He finds that there 
is a decrease in the morale of employees and remaining workers are less inclined to exert 
effort within the workplace. If these results are widespread within the firm then future firm 
performance could suffer following downsizing activity.  
 In another study that examines the productivity and performance effects of 
downsizing, Sutton and D'Aunno (1989) note that layoffs lead to: (1) Restrictions in 
information processing; i.e. no innovation, less teamwork; (2) constriction of control; i.e. more 
micro-managing, less decentralization; and (3) conservation of resources; i.e. less risk-taking, 
fewer R&D investments. These actions serve to reduce the productivity and financial 
performance of the firm.32 
 
B. ESOP Literature 
 
 ESOP literature is part of a larger genre of research that looks at the corporate 
governance of a firm. Jensen and Meckling (1979) look at several different organizational 
forms ranging from purely labor-controlled firms (i.e. Soviet firm) to pure-rental and 
cooperatives to partnerships and private corporations. They argue that the structure of 
property and contracting rights under which the firm operates has a significant influence over 
production opportunity set of the firm.  
 For the labor-managed firm, several problems exist within the market economy that 
makes it more difficult for labor-managed firms to operate efficiently. The first problem is the 
control problem, where the one-vote-per-employee rule ensures that everyone gets the same 
benefit regardless of contribution. Another problem is definition of net revenues, where 
workers have an incentive convert firm wealth into personal wealth. The final problem is the 
savings-investment problem, where workers prefer to invest in consumer durable assets (eg. 
housing, cars, jewelry) instead of productive assets. As a result, Jensen and Meckling posit that 
labor-managed firms such as ESOPs will never achieve efficiency in a free market because of 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
32 Note that these effects are in direct contrast to the objectives of ESOPs. 
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the control problem (worker versus worker), the definition of net revenues (the worker versus 
the state), and the savings-investment problem (worker versus self).  
 Olubunmi, Mehotra, and Morck (2005) also examine labor-controlled publicly traded 
firms. Using regression analysis, they find that these firms deviate more from value 
maximization than other firms. Moreover, labor-controlled firms tend to restrict research and 
development, invest less in capital assets and grow more slowly than their non-labor 
counterparts. Finally, Olubunmi et al. find that both the labor and total factor productivity of 
labor-controlled firms are lower. 
 With respect to existing ESOP literature, previous researchers have examined the effect 
that employee ownership has on the productivity and performance of the firm. However, these 
studies are limited by the fact that they focus on the time period immediately following 
adoption of the ESOP. Depending on the reason for ESOP adoption, the productivity and 
performance benefits of employee ownership might be short-lived. Beatty (1992) confirms the 
temporary nature of ESOP-induced performance when she finds that companies who adopted 
ESOPs to reduce the likelihood of hostile takeovers had decreased financial performance.  
 Similarly, Conte and Svejnar (1988) use OLS and instrumental variables to 
simultaneously measure the impact of employee ownership on the productivity of the firm. 
They find that moderate amounts of employee ownership affect productivity negatively, even 
when controlling for worker participation in management, profit sharing, and unionization.  
 These findings by previous researchers highlight the effect that downsizing has on the 
firm’s productivity and financial performance. However, none of the previous studies examines 
the impact that an existing ESOP has on a downsizing firm. Nor do they examine the 
relationship between productivity (as measured by TFP) and performance (as measured by 
Tobin’s Q). It is intuitive to assume that high productivity leads to better financial performance, 
but the opposite might be true. In other words, maintaining a high level of productivity may be 
expensive as the firm invests more in those capital assets (computer technology, updated 
equipment) that improve productivity. As more resources are invested in assets, Tobin’s Q may 
decrease, especially during periods of economic recession when stock market values are 
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decreasing. Since the calculation of Tobin’s Q is a ratio of market value of equity and debt to 
the book value of assets, higher productivity might automatically lead to lower Q values.33 
 Given this potentially negative correlation between TFP and Tobin’s Q, the effect of 
downsizing on the productivity and financial performance becomes even more ambiguous. The 
absence of research on the interaction between ESOPs and downsizing leaves a crucial 
question unanswered: Does employee ownership reduce or exacerbate the negative impact of 
downsizing on the firm? Although extant research into the effect of downsizing on productivity 
and financial performance invariably omits any reference to employee stock ownership, the 
existing research on downsizing can still be used as a starting point for analysis. To that end, 
this paper will compare the productivity and financial performances of ESOP versus non-ESOP 
firms that have engaged in downsizing activity to determine whether layoffs affect the firms 
differently. 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
33 During recessionary periods like that which characterized a portion of the 1990s, Tobin’s Q ratio is understandably low since the 
numerator (market value of equity) is decreasing. If firms are also increasing their computer/technology capital stock (which also occurred 
during the 1990s) then total assets are increasing, as well. This increase in assets cause the denominator of the Q ratio to increase, thereby 
putting even more downward pressure on the Q value of the firm. 
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Hypotheses 
 
 The productivity and financial performance effects of downsizing continue long 
after the announcement effect has worn off. Depending on the degree of incentive 
alignment between shareholders, managers, and employees, the long-term productivity and 
performance effects might be positive or negative. Downsizing could force less productive 
workers to exert more effort, thereby increasing the productivity and financial 
performance of the firm. Alternatively, downsizing might cause employees to experience 
lower morale so that they have less desire to exert greater effort; if such is the case, 
productivity falls and the financial performance of the firm is reduced. Moreover, if 
employee stock ownership is present within the firm, an entirely new source of variation in 
employee reaction must be analyzed. This difference in possible reactions highlights the 
need for further research on the effect of downsizing and its interaction with employee 
stock ownership plans. More specifically, such research will help show how ESOP firms 
compare to non-ESOP firms in terms of productivity and financial performance before and 
after the downsizing announcement. 
Researchers have already documented the generally negative effects of downsizing, 
including increased agency problems (Sutton and D’Aunno, 1989), lower employee 
productivity (Capelli, 2000) and poor financial performance (Cascio et al., 1997). These 
effects are in direct contrast to the reduced agency problems ((Klein (1987), Kumbhaker 
and Dunbar (1993); Fitzroy and Kraft (1987)), higher employee productivity (Beatty 
(1995), Jones and Kato (1995)), and better financial performance (USGAO study of ESOPs 
(1987); Quarry and Rosen (1987)) that researchers have documented in ESOP firms. To 
date, however, there has been no research on the impact that downsizing has on firms with 
existing ESOP plans in place. This study will fill that empirical void. 
Given the diametrical effects that ESOPs and downsizing have on the firm, an 
interesting question arises when both of these labor decisions occur within the same 
firm—that is, how downsizing decisions affect ESOP firms. By incorporating employee 
stock ownership into the analysis of corporate downsizing decisions, this study examines 
the impact of layoffs on productivity and financial performance; it also provides a quasi-
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test of Jensen and Meckling’s hypothesis that agency problems are reduced when firm 
ownership is bestowed on the agent (employee). 
 To better understand the impact of downsizing on the two types of firms, it is 
helpful to look at the inter-firm comparisons (ESOP versus non-ESOP) as well as the 
intra-firm comparisons (pre- versus post-downsizing for each firm type, respectively). The 
first hypothesis will examine the productivity and financial performance of the firm before 
the downsizing announcement. Assuming that two firms within the same industry face a 
similar decrease in demand for their product, then, ceteris paribus, an ESOP firm should 
downsize at about the same level as a non-ESOP firm. However, the employee-owners of 
ESOP firms might use their ownership power to thwart or delay downsizing, which could 
cause the ESOP firms to wait too long to downsize and incur even greater financial distress. If 
there is a difference in the timing of downsizing announcement, it might be an indication of 
agency problems. The hypothesis related to this test is as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1: There is no difference between the productivity/performance of ESOP 
versus non-ESOP companies before downsizing, ceteris paribus. 
 
The remaining hypotheses examine the changes in productivity and performance 
conditional on the downsizing decision. In other words, given that downsizing has 
occurred, how does it affect employee productivity and financial performance of the firm? 
To begin analyzing the effect that downsizing has on the productivity and financial 
performance of the firm, the second hypothesis simply examines the status quo that 
downsizing has no effect on the productivity or financial performance of the firm: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Given the downsizing decision, there is no change in the the 
productivity/financial performance of the firm, regardless of ESOP status. 
 
 The results from testing Hypothesis 2 will serve as a basis of comparison with 
other studies that examine the productivity and financial performance of downsizing firms. 
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This hypothesis makes no assumptions regarding the value or the magnitude of 
productivity/financial performance changes, and ESOP firms are not distinguished from 
non-ESOP firms. Regardless of the outcome from testing Hypothesis 2, subsequent tests 
will be conducted to further examine the impact of ESOPs on downsizing firms. 
Specifically, various characteristics of the firm and its downsizing decision will be 
examined to determine if they cause differences in the productivity/financial performance 
of ESOP versus non-ESOP firms. 
 The first characteristic to be examined is the existence of the Employee Stock 
Ownership Plan itself. For firms with older ESOP plans or with high levels of employee 
ownership, the ESOP participants have acquired a higher degree of knowledge or 
sophistication regarding their powers as shareholders (Klein, 1987). If ESOP firms are 
better able to overcome the negative impact of downsizing by outperforming the post-
downsizing productivity/performance of non-ESOP firms, ceteris paribus, then it could be 
an indication that employee-owners do not lower their productivity in response to layoffs. 
In other words, there is a “bright side” to ESOPs that causes employees to act more like 
principals than agents and Jensen and Meckling’s hypothesis that firm ownership reduces 
the agency problem is correct. 
Alternatively, if ESOP firms fare worse than non-ESOP firms in terms of 
productivity and performance or if the increase in productivity/performance is not as great 
as that of non-ESOPs, then the ESOP might have exacerbated the agency problem when 
downsizing decisions are necessary; thereby exposing the “dark side” of employee 
ownership. ESOP participants might try to reduce the ability of managers to alter the 
workforce to a more value-maximizing level, thus causing the productivity/financial 
performance of the firm to decrease. If this is the case, then ESOPs have a negative impact 
on the firm, especially during periods of poor performance. 
Given both the “bright” and “dark” side of ESOPs, the long term impact of 
downsizing is uncertain for firms with employee stock ownership plans. Different 
characteristics of the downsizing decision and/or ESOP firm could cause the productivity 
and performance of the firm to either increase or decrease. For example, the level of 
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downsizing itself might cause the productivity/performance of the firm to change. If the 
level is high, employee-owners could experience a greater decrease in morale, even though 
the high downsizing level might be necessary to maximize the value of the firm. 
Alternatively, for low levels of downsizing, employees might be motivated to increase 
their productivity, which in turn will increase the financial performance of the firm (Kraft, 
1991; Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984). The following hypothesis is used to examine the post-
downsizing productivity/performance of ESOP versus non-ESOP firms: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Given the downsizing decision, the percentage of employee ownership has 
no influence on the productivity/performance of ESOP versus non-ESOP 
companies, ceteris paribus. 
 
 The results from testing Hypothesis 3 will provide insight into the role that ESOPs 
have on the downsizing firm. More importantly, this test will directly determine how 
productivity and performance change as the level of employee ownership changes. 
However, the percentage of employee ownership alone might not explain the post-
downsizing changes in the firm. There could be employee entrenchment within the 
downsizing ESOP firm that negatively impacts the productivity and performance of the 
company. 
 An indication that ESOP firms have employee entrenchment might be the 
interaction between the level of downsizing and the percentage of employee ownership. 
Assuming that ESOP and non-ESOP firms of similar size within the same industry face a 
similar decrease in demand for their product, then ceteris paribus, the ESOP firm should 
downsize at about the same level as the non-ESOP firm. However, ex-ante, the employee-
owners of ESOP firms who wish to maintain their job security could use their ownership 
powers to reduce the level of downsizing. If the level of downsizing is lower for ESOP 
firms than non-ESOP firms, ceteris paribus, then employee-owners might be entrenched in 
the firm. The consequence of this entrenchment could mean that neither productivity nor 
performance increases significantly after downsizing.  
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Alternatively, if downsizing levels at ESOP firms are commensurate with non-
ESOP firms, then it might indicate that employee-owners are not entrenched in the firm 
and managers are able to downsize at levels that maximize the value of the firm. All things 
equal, the downsizing levels of ESOP firms will be as high as that of non-ESOP firms 
when there is no entrenchment. However, higher downsizing levels often lead to employee 
discontent, which directly impacts the productivity of the firm. Thus financial performance 
might increase as a result of the labor cost savings, but productivity could decrease due to 
lower employee-owner morale. Hypothesis 4 is used to examine the relationship between 
employee ownership and downsizing and the impact on the firm’s productivity and 
financial performance: 
 
Hypothesis 4: Given the downsizing decision, there is no interaction between the level of 
downsizing and the level of employee ownership that influences the 
productivity/performance of ESOP companies. 
 
 The results from testing Hypothesis 4 examine only one set of internal owners in 
the firm: employees. The other group of internal owners who can also influence the 
productivity and performance of the firm is the firm’s managers. Managers influence post-
downsizing productivity and performance through their choice of downsizing level. Their 
choice of downsizing might be based on their ownership percentage of the firm; the larger 
the managers’ share of the firm, the more likely they are to set a downsizing level that 
maximizes the value of the firm, ceteris paribus. However, larger downsizing levels 
typically lead to greater discontent in the remaining workers, which in turn leads to lower 
productivity despite higher financial performance, ex post. If managers are more 
concerned with receiving a better return on their share of the firm, they will downsize at 
appropriate levels which could lead to greater financial returns.34 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
34 Greater financial returns are the result of higher labor savings. 
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On the other hand, managers that institute lower levels of downsizing could see an 
increase in productivity as workers exert more effort to avoid job loss.35 This increase in 
productivity should translate into slightly better financial performance. However the 
increase in performance might not be as great as for higher levels of downsizing because 
labor costs are still relatively high. If managers are more concerned with improving 
productivity without alienating employees, then they might downsize at lower levels that 
increase productivity yet minimally improve financial performance. The hypothesis to test 
the interaction effect that managerial ownership and downsizing have on the firm is: 
 
Hypothesis 5: There is no interaction between the level of downsizing and the level of 
managerial ownership that influences the productivity/performance of 
ESOP companies versus non-ESOP companies. 
 
 Hypothesis 4 and Hypothesis 5 both examine the individual effect that internal 
owners, namely employees and managers, have on the productivity and performance of the 
downsizing firm. Yet, the reality might be that employee- and managerial-owners do not 
operate independently of each other. If the employee-owners of ESOP firms have 
“captured” management, then these “ensnared” managers are unwilling to institute high 
levels of downsizing, even when it is necessary, because to do so would alienate possible 
allies who could support the manager’s job tenure. Moreover, for higher levels of 
employee- and managerial-ownership, these internal corporate players become insulated 
from the consequences of decisions that do not necessarily maximize firm value. Thus, 
positive interaction between these two variables could be an indication that employees and 
managers work together to improve the productivity/performance of the downsizing firm. 
Alternatively, a negative relationship means that for a given level of managerial ownership, 
the productivity/performance of the firm decreases as the level of employee ownership 
increases. Hypothesis 6 is used to test for collusion between employees and management:  
_______________________________________________________________________ 
35 With low levels of downsizing, the probability of job loss is lower for each employee. Thus, workers feel they have a chance to retain 
their employement and might work harder to increase their individual probability of remaining employed. 
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Hypothesis 6: There is no interaction between the level of employee ownership and the 
level of managerial ownership that influences the productivity/performance 
of ESOP companies. 
 
All of the above hypotheses test the impact that downsizing has on the productivity 
and performance of the two types of firms. In conducting these tests, the research will 
determine whether ESOP firms have different productivity changes after downsizing, 
when compared to non-ESOP firms. All things equal, if ESOP firms perform better than 
non-ESOP firms after downsizing, then perhaps the beneficial characteristics of the ESOP 
are able to overcome the negative effects of downsizing. Alternatively, if ESOP firms fare 
worse than non-ESOP firms in terms of productivity and performance, then employee 
ownership, rather than addressing the agency problem within the firm, might actually 
exacerbate it, especially during periods of downsizing. 
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Methodology and Data 
 
 There is no question that downsizing activity affects the value of the firm. There is, 
however, ambiguity in the direction and magnitude of the effect, especially when ESOPs 
are present within the downsizing firm. This paper measures and documents the 
differences in productivity and financial performance that accompany downsizing decisions 
by comparing the inter-firm (ESOP versus non-ESOP) as well as intra-firm (pre-
downsizing versus post-downsizing) changes that result from downsizing. To conduct 
these tests, the methodology for this study involves three stages. First, the productivity 
measures are calculated by extracting Total Factor Productivity (TFP) residuals. Second, 
Tobin’s Q-ratios are calculated for all firms as a proxy for performance. Finally, the TFP 
residuals and Q-ratios calculated in the first two stages serve as dependent variables that 
are regressed against ESOPs, downsizing, and other explanatory variables that influence 
the productivity and performance of downsizing firms. 
  In the first stage, the productivity is calculated using Total Factor Productivity 
(TFP). TFP is a method of estimating productivity growth within a firm, industry, or 
country whereby a production function is used to extract the value that labor, capital, and 
materials/energy contribute to output. The residual from this estimation (also known as 
TFP residual) is interpreted as the relative productivity rank of a plant within its industry 
(Schoar, 2002). When it is regressed against other explanatory variables, the resulting 
parameter estimates measure how these other “factors” contribute to the productivity of 
the firm. The factors of interest in this research include ESOP, the level of downsizing, 
and the amount of managerial ownership. 
 In general, the specification of the TFP model begins with a modified Cobb-
Douglas function as follows: 
 
ijtijtjtijtjtijtjtjtijt MdLcKbaY ε++++= )ln()ln()ln()ln(    (8) 
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where Y, K, L,and M are the production output (as measured by sales), capital, labor, and 
materials/energy, respectively, indexed by individual plants i, in industries j for each year t. 
This specification allows for different factor intensities in different industries, as defined by 
the 2-digit industry codes.36 
 When Yijt is differentiated with respect to time, we get an approximation of 
technical change which measures any kind of shift in the production function (Solow, 
1957). Given that two firms within the same industry have equal labor, capital, and 
materials, their productivity should be the same, ceteris paribus. Any difference in the 
productivity might be caused by firm-specific attributes and will be reflected in the residual 
term, whether it is positive or negative. This residual error term, εijt, from Equation (3) 
measures the contribution to output that is not captured by capital, labor, or materials, but 
is instead related to other factors. This research proposes that the ESOP, the level of 
downsizing, and the percentage of managerial ownership are three of the more influential 
factors. 
 In the second stage of analysis, Tobin’s Q ratio will be calculated for each firm. 
Defined as the ratio of the firm’s market value to replacement cost of assets, Tobin’s Q 
ratio measures the valuation premium of the firm. If the Q ratio is greater than one, it 
indicates that the market value of the firm is greater than the cost of replacing its assets. 
Thus, firms with relatively high Q ratios are believed to have more growth opportunities 
and generally have better financial performance. 
 By using the Q ratio, the performance measure is not subject to the inherent 
industry distortions that accompany other measures of performance, such as return on 
assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). These measures are heavily influenced by 
industry practices, tax laws, and accounting conventions (Wernerfelt and Montgomery, 
1988). Conversely, in theory the Q ratio, removes these biases because it is based on a 
capital market measure of firm rents. After controlling for other factors that influence the 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
36 Materials are only used when estimating the production function of manufacturing or production firms. It is not used for service 
industries. 
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Q ratio (e.g. firm size and degree of leverage), we will be able to specifically test the effect 
of downsizing and ESOPs on firm performance.37 
 After calculating the TFP residuals for productivity and the Tobin’s Q ratio 
measures for financial performance, the final stage of analysis will involve regressing these 
values against firm-specific explanatory variables to determine if those variables influence 
the productivity and performance of downsizing firms. Due to the nature of this study, 
panel data analysis will be used to control for time-constant unobserved influences on the 
dependent variable. Panel data analysis is preferable to standard OLS procedures because 
panel data provide flexibility in aggregating information to compare results either across 
time, across different firms, or within the same firm. In addition, because the assumptions 
for standard OLS estimation (e.g. omitted variables, serial correlation, and 
homoskedasticity) might be violated in this study, panel data allow the researcher to make 
assumptions about the unobserved effects that transform the regression equation to one 
that has consistent estimators. 
 The data sets are created by analyzing the same cross-sectional units, (in this case, 
downsizing ESOP and non-ESOP firms), over a period of five years: two years before 
downsizing, the year downsizing occurs, and two years after downsizing. By organizing 
the panel data in this fashion, the research is able to control the unobserved effect, thus 
resulting in a cross-sectional regression. The specific panel data method that is utilized in 
this study is random-effects estimation using pooled generalized least squares techniques 
(GLS) on unbalanced panels. The equation is as follows: 
 
yit = β0 + β1Xjit1 +β2Xjit2 +…+ βkXjitk + ai + ujit, t = (-2, -1 0, 1, 2)  (9) 
 
where yit is the dependent variable (in this case, TFP and Tobin’s Q, respectively); β0 is 
the intercept; Xjitk is the kth explanatory variable for the ith firm in the jth industry at time 
period, t for all k, i, j; ai is the unobserved effect; and ujit is the residual error term.  
_______________________________________________________________________ 
37 Because ESOP plans are usually leveraged transactions, there could be interaction between ESOPs and debt level. This possibility will 
be considered when testing the model. 
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 The inclusion of an intercept term allows the researcher to assume that ai has zero 
mean. In other words, we assume that the unobserved effect in Equation (9) is 
uncorrelated with each of the explanatory variables in all time periods: 
 
Cov (Xjit, ai) = 0, t = (-2, -1, 0, 1, 2)    (10) 
 
 Given this assumption, Equation (9) becomes a random-effects model. 
 The main advantage of using the random-effects model is that it allows fixed 
independent variables (such as unionization or ESOP percentage) that do not change over 
time to remain in the model and to contribute their explanatory power. Unfortunately, 
random-effects estimation also has its drawbacks, including serial correlation. To correct 
for this problem, Equation (9) is transformed by subtracting a fraction of the time averages 
from the corresponding variable as follows: 
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and vjit= ai + uit,  with the overbars denoting time averages. 
 Equation (11) represents the quasi-demeaned data on each variable. This equation 
is known as the random-effects transformation of the panel data. Note that a fraction, λ, 
of the unobserved effect, ai, remains in the model. This specification allows us to measure 
the relative importance of unobserved variables in the model. If λ is close to zero, then the 
random-effects model is very similar to the pooled OLS estimates; that is, the unobserved 
effects are relatively unimportant. Alternatively, as λ approaches unity, then the random 
effects model is almost identical to the fixed-effects model, which indicates that 
unobserved effects are correlated with the explanatory variables and should therefore be 
subtracted out.  
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 One additional problem often arises with panel data methods. Given the nature of 
this research, there is a possibility that downsizing firms in distress will be merged, taken 
over, or dissolved. To address this, unbalanced panels are used to allow for attrition. 
Unbalanced panels occur when observations drop out of the regression due to missing 
data. Although it is important to uncover the cause of attrition and to ensure that it is 
uncorrelated with the error term, estimation can still take place.38 
 Panel data, while difficult to obtain, provides many advantages over regular data 
sets or pooled cross sections. The first advantage, discussed earlier, is that it allows 
control over unobserved characteristics of the firm. Another advantage is that it enables 
the researcher to study the results of decision making—in this case, downsizing decisions. 
But perhaps the most important benefit of panel data analysis is that it allows the 
researcher to assign causality links to the empirical results, thereby giving conclusive 
statements more power. Panel data analysis permits the following comparisons: 
 
  Intra-Group Comparisons 
   Pre-Downsizing ESOP versus Post-Downsizing ESOP 
   Pre-Downsizing Non-ESOP versus Post Downsizing Non-ESOP 
  Inter-Group Comparisons 
   Pre-Downsizing ESOP versus Pre-Downsizing Non-ESOP 
   Post-Downsizing ESOP versus Post-Downsizing Non-ESOP 
 
By conducting these two-way comparisons, this study provides greater insight into the 
effect that a downsizing decision has on the firm’s productivity and performance. 
The panel data set is constructed from downsizing announcements made in the 
Wall Street Journal during the ten-year span from 1990-1999.39 A downsizing firm is 
defined as a company that announces a decision to lay off a portion of its workforce; an 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
38 The original data set from the wealth effects study in essay 1 is used here. However, due to attrition and/or lack of data for all years, 
approximately 300 firms were exluded, leaving 416 firms (non-ESOP=312; ESOP=104). Despite the diminished number of firms, there 
are still enough observations to comply with assumptions for a large sample size. 
39 The time period was chosen to incorporate and/or reduce any distortions that would accompany the 1986 change in tax laws.   
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ESOP firm is defined as a company that has an employee stock ownership plan in place 
that adheres to the requirements established under ERISA of 1974. Data on ESOP firms 
are cross-referenced with downsizing data to identify downsizing ESOP firms.  
  To isolate the effect of the announcement, the downsizing firm should have no 
previous layoffs at least three years prior to the “current” announcement and no 
subsequent layoffs for at least three years after the “current” announcement.40 Finally, no 
other announcement (e.g. bankruptcy) can be made in conjunction with the downsizing 
decision, as this might cloud the effects of the layoff itself.41 
 The panel data set used in this study consists of productivity and financial 
performance measures calculated for two years before, the year of, and two years 
following the downsizing announcement. In addition, firm specific explanatory variables, 
including ESOP, downsizing level, and internal ownership are calculated for the same time 
periods. These explanatory variables are then regressed against the TFP residual and Q 
ratio to measure the effect that ESOP has on the productivity and performance of the 
downsizing firm. Table 16 provides a list and description of the accounting measures used 
to examine the effects of ESOP and downsizing on on the productivity and financial 
performance of the downsizing firm.  
These variables capture firm-specific attributes of the downsizing firm. However, 
because downsizing can be cyclical to some degree and because companies within an industry 
face similar market challenges, the market conditions must be extracted from firm-specific data 
to capture only the firm’s response to layoffs. The 2-digit industry code will be used to separate 
between industries. The descriptive statistics and frequency tables are shown in Table 17 and 
Table 18, respectively. Table 19 details the TFP measures for the downsizing firms for the time 
period t = -2 to t = 2, where t = -2 represents firm data two years before downsizing and t = 2 
represents firm data two years after downsizing. Similar information is shown for Tobin’s Q in 
Table 20. 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
40 Since layoff decisions can be made more than once during the life cycle of a corporation, a company cannot be excluded from research 
consideration for having multiple layoff instances as long as those instances are sufficiently spaced apart. 
41 Because downsizing announcements are often accompanied by plant closings or occur as the result of mergers, these reasons for 
downsizing will not be excluded. Instead, they will be identified via a dummy variable. 
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 As evidenced by the summary statistics in Table 17, ESOP firms are significantly 
different from non-ESOP firms for all variables except HERF, which measures the degree 
of competition in the particular industry. Non-ESOP firms have higher levels of 
downsizing, higher percentages of managerial ownership, and higher percentages of 
institutional ownership than ESOP firms, and the difference is significant at the 1 percent 
level. On the other hand, ESOP firms tend to be more diversified and have higher market 
values than non-ESOPs.  
 With respect to the qualitative variables outlined in Table 18, ESOPs are more 
likely to downsize due to restructuring whereas non-ESOPs are more likely to close the 
plant. For both firm types, merger activity is rare; however unionization is more prevalent 
in ESOP firms than in non-ESOP firms. 
Tables 19 and 20 depict the summary statistics of all five time periods (two years 
before downsizing, the year of downsizing, and two years after downsizing) for TFP and 
Q, respectively. In the two years before downsizing occurs, non-ESOP firms have low but 
positive levels of productivity whereas ESOP firms have negative productivity. During the 
event year two years later, the productivity for both firm types has improved, but non-
ESOP firms experience a higher level of improvement. Note that for all firms, regardless 
of ESOP status, productivity is significantly positive after downsizing, (time t = 0 to t = 
2). However, non-ESOP firms demonstrate greater improvement in productivity over the 
5-year span, going from a TFP of 0.0653 at time t = -2 to a TFP of 0.1439 at time t = 2. 
For the same 5-year span, ESOP firms go from a TFP of -0.0082 at time t = -2 to a TFP 
of 0.0313 at time t = 2. These results suggest that ESOP firms are less productive than 
non-ESOPs in both the pre- and post-downsizing period. More importantly, ESOP firms 
never attain the level of productivity that non-ESOPs have. This is the first indication that 
ESOPs distort the incentives of employee-owners. 
With respect to the Q ratio, there is a significant difference between ESOP and 
non-ESOP firms only for time periods t = -2, t = -1 and t = 1. In addition, note what 
happens to Q in the pre- versus post-downsizing period; from time t = -2 to t = 0, the 
financial performance of the firm is decreasing for both firm types whereas in time t = 0 to 
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t = 2, the performance in increasing. This decrease and increase is much more pronounced 
for non-ESOP firms than for ESOP firms, which tend to remain much lower than non-
ESOPs. This result suggests that non-ESOP firms have better performance than ESOP 
firms in all time periods. However, non-ESOPs fail to attain the pre-downsizing level of 
performace whereas downsizing causes ESOP to perform even more the the pre-
downsizing level of performance. In other words, downsizing has a better impact on the 
performance of ESOP firms. 
Table 21 shows the difference in TFP means and Q means across various time 
periods. The time period from t = -2 to t = 0 captures the pre-downsizing 
productivity/performance while the time period t = 0 to t = 2 examine the post-downsizing 
period. The time period t = -2 to t = 2 compares the productivity and performance of the 
firm for two years before downsizing to two years after downsizing. This table shows that 
there is significant improvement in productivity for firms in general and for non-ESOP 
firms, in particular, for all time periods, but ESOP firms are slow to show improvement 
during the two years after downsizing. However, they do show overall improvement when 
comparing t = -2 to t = 2.  
As for the comparisons across time periods for Q, there is evidence that firms, in 
general and non-ESOP firms, in particular, experience significantly negative financial 
performance when comparing time periods t = -2 to t = 0 and t = -2 to t = 2. However, 
ESOP firms only show negative performance for time t = -2 to t = 0; for time period t = -2 
to t = 2, ESOP firms outperform non-ESOPs. 
The results from the difference of means tests provide insight into the effect that 
employee stock ownership has on downsizing firms. The results provide preliminary 
evidence to reject both Hypothesis 1, that there in no difference in the pre- downsizing 
productivity/performance of the firms and Hypothesis 2, that there is no change in the 
productivity/performance of the firm, in general, given the downsizing decision. Despite 
the preliminary verification of productivity/performance effects of downsizing, regression 
analysis of TFP and Q will provide even greater insight that can be used to make causal 
statements.
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Regression Equation and Results 
 
 As described earlier, the regression analysis is done in three stages. In the first 
stage, Total Factor Productivity (TFP) residuals are calculated. In the second stage, 
Tobin’s Q is determined for each downsizing firm. (Both TFP and Q are calculated for the 
5-year span covering two years before downsizing, the year of downsizing, and two years 
after downsizing.) Finally, the third stage involves regressing TFP and Q against the main 
variables of interest (DS, ESOP, MGR_OWN, and the interaction between them) as well 
as other explanatory control variables. 
The first step in calculating the TFP residual is to estimate the production function. 
Using a modified Cobb-Douglas production function, the values for SALES, CAPITAL, 
LABOR, and MATERIAL are determined for each downsizing firm and used in the 
following equation:  
 
ln(SALESij) = Aij + ln(CAPITALij) + ln(LABORij) + ln(MATERIALij)  +  ei (12) 
 
where SALES, CAPITAL, LABOR, and MATERIAL are as described earlier, Aij is a 
constant technology-efficiency parameter for each industry represented in the sample, and 
ei is the (TFP) residual and measures the difference between actual value-added and 
predicted value-added.  
Although the TFP method of measuring productivity is different from the 
methodology used by other researchers, it provides a more complete examination of how 
other factors (e.g., ESOPs and downsizing) impact productivity. Similar to the event-
study methodology, which analyses “abnormal returns” using firm-specific attributes, TFP 
examines the effect of firm-specific factors that contribute to productivity. 
 After the TFP residual is determined, the next stage of the regression analysis is to 
determine the Tobin’s Q ratios for each of the downsizing firms. Tobin’s Q is a capital 
market measure of the firm’s rents that is equal to the sum of the market value of equity, 
the liquidation value of preferred stock, the book value of long-term debt, and the book 
value of short-term debt. This sum is then divided by the book value of total assets. If Q 
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values are greater than 1, then the firms are believed to have better performance in both 
the current and future time periods. 
Once both the TFP and Q values are determined, the following regressions will be 
conducted to measure the effect of ESOPs on productivity (TFP) and performance (Q): 
 
TFPit = α0 + β1DSit + β2ESOPit + β3 MGR_OWNit + β4INST_OWNit + β5LNMVit + 
 β6EAGEit + β7ESOPit*DSit + β8MOit*DSit + β9ESOPit*MOit + 
β10HERFit + β11SEGSit +β12UNIONit + β13MERGEit +  
 β14CPit + β15ITit + β16CXit + β17DDit + β18IPit + β19REit +  
β20DSit2 + β21ESOPit2 + β22MOit2 + β23EAGEit2 + εi     (13) 
 
Qit = α0 + β1DSit + β2ESOPit + β3 MGR_OWNit + β4INST_OWNit + β5TFPit + 
 β6EAGEit + β7ESOPit*DSit + β8MOit*DSit + β9ESOPit*MOit + 
β10HERFit + β11SEGSit +β12UNIONit + β13MERGEit +  
 β14CPit + β15ITit + β16CXit + β17DDit + β18IPit + β19REit +  
β20DSit2 + β21ESOPit2 + β22MOit2 + β23EAGEit2 + εi     (14) 
 
The main variables of interest in this equation are DS, ESOP, MGR_OWN, ESOP_AGE, 
ESOP*DS, MO*DS and ESOP*MO.42 These variables capture, either directly or through 
interaction, the effect that a employee stock ownership has on the downsizing firm. The 
first two variables (DS and ESOP) along with the interaction variable (ESOP*DS) 
measure the impact that downsizing and employee ownership have on the productivity and 
performance of the firm. The interaction term ESOP*DS serves as an indicator of 
potential interaction between employee-owners and the level of downsizing that influences 
the productivity and performance of the firm. To capture the possibility of collusion, the 
variables MGR_OWN, MO*DS and ESOP*MO are included (Gamble, (2000); Hallock, 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
42 “MO” stands for Managerial Ownership 
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(1998)).43 The sign on the interaction terms indicate whether there is positive or negative 
collusion between employees and managers that impacts productivity and performance. 
 EAGE serves as a proxy for the degree of sophistication or learning curve that 
employee-owners have acquired. Firms that have older ESOP plans might also have 
employees with longer employment tenure, greater influence over managers, more 
knowledge of corporate information, and greater awareness of the powers afforded by the 
ESOP. Thus, firms with older ESOP plans might have greater incidences of employee 
entrenchment, which manifests itself in the form of lower productivity and performance. 
 Variables are added to control for firm-specific attributes that might cloud the 
effect of ESOPs. They include INST_OWN, HERF, SEGS, LNMV, and the reasons for 
downsizing. Institutional Ownership (INST_OWN) measures the percentage of the 
downsizing firm held by institutional owners. As large block holders of the firm’s shares, 
institutions hold great sway over managerial decisions and often hold a seat on the board 
of directors. They are more likely to call for downsizing when the firm is performing 
poorly than widely dispersed shareholders who typically hold a very small percentage of 
the firm. 
The Herfindahl index, as measured by HERF, captures the level of competitiveness 
in a particular industry and proxies for the firm’s market power. For highly competitive 
industries, layoffs often occur at higher rates as companies alter their variable costs (i.e. 
labor) to maintain profitability and maximize firm value.  
SEGS is used to measure the extent to which corporate diversification (i.e., 
conglomerates) impacts the productivity/performance of downsizing firms. The variable, 
LNMV, controls for the size of the firm. Larger firms usually are better able to withstand 
market downturns. Thus, they might have lower levels of downsizing, ceteris paribus, 
than smaller firms, which could lead to less negative productivity and performance effects. 
 The downsizing reasons are used to distinguish between “positive” reasons (IP = 
Improve Productivity, IT = Improve Technology, CX = Cut Expenses, RE = 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
43 Gamble (2000) argues that managers of ESOP firms might collude with employee-owners to ensure their mutual job security. Hallock 
(1998) finds that CEOs receive monetary benefits in the year following downsizing activity. 
  
  90
Restructuring) and “negative” reasons (DD = Declining Demand, CP = Close Plant). 
Based on the research of Palmon et al., (1997) and Chen et al., (2001), these variables are 
included to control for the downsizing reasons given by management.  
 Finally, to control for curvilinear effects, squared terms are included in the 
equation for DS2, ESOP2, MO2 and EAGE2. By including second-order variables, the 
model is better able to capture decreasing or increasing marginal effects of downsizing, 
employee ownership, managerial ownership, and the age of the ESOP.  
 Each of these variables, when included in the regression equation used to analyze 
the productivity and performance effects of downsizing, should provide insight into the 
question of how employee stock ownership impacts the downsizing decisions of the firm. 
The significance of these variables in explaining the variation in the productivity and 
performance of downsizing firms contribute to a better understanding of the agency 
problems that exist within the firm. The results from estimating Equations (13) and (14) 
on the full sample (N=416) of downsizing firms are shown in Tables 22 and 23, 
respectively.44 Two different models are analyzed for each dependent variable; the pre-
downsizing model analyzes TFP and Q for time t = -2 to t = 0 whereas the post-
downsizing model looks at time period t = 0 to t = 2.  
 In examining Table 22, although ESOP did not have a significant effect on 
productivity for firms in general, notice that the DS variable has a significantly positive 
parameter estimate (DS = 0.8325), indicating that prior to the downsizing event, the 
“expectation” of downsizing has a positive impact on productivity. 45 In other words, 
regardless of the ESOP status, employees become more productive prior to downsizing, 
perhaps in an effort to avoid job loss.46 However, following the downsizing 
announcement, downsizing has a negative effect (DS = -0.5983) on the firm’s productivity 
and many of the other variables become less significant, ex post. Also note that managerial 
ownership has a negative influence on productivity before downsizing, whereas firm size, 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
44 When reporting the regression results, the curvilinear effects (i.e. squared terms) are often excuded because they are rarely significant. 
In those instances where they are significant, they are included in the table. 
45 Downsizing activity within an industry usually affects a significant proportion of the firms within that industry.  
46 Stiglitz and Weiss (1983) argue that layoffs act as an incentive to increase worker productivity.  
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institutional ownership and decreasing competitiveness (as measured by HERF) have a 
positive impact on productivity. Note further that firms that stated “improved 
productivity” as their reason for downsizing experienced significantly positive 
improvements in TFP. Finally, there is evidence of a curvilinear effect for downsizing (DS2 
= -1.4791) and managerial ownership (MO2 = 1.9656) and there is evidence of positive 
interaction between managerial ownership and the level of downsizing (MO*DS = 
3.5870). These results for productivity suggest that downsizing is more effective than 
ESOPs in motivating employees to increase productivity; however post-downsizing 
productivity is negatively affected by layoffs. 
With respect to Tobin’s Q, downsizing has a negative impact in both the pre- and 
post-downsizing period as does the percentage of employee ownership. The negative sign 
on ESOP in the pre-downsizing period could be an indication that ESOP firms delay 
downsizing decisions for too long, and therefore are more likely to have greater financial 
distress before downsizing. Rational external investors, who perhaps expected the 
manager to make downsizing decisions earlier, note the delay and value the firm lower. 
This devaluing of the firm causes the Q ratio to be lower.  
In addition to the negative impact of downsizing and employee ownership, 
unionization has a negative effect on performance whereas merger activity and managerial 
ownership exert a positive influence on financial performance in the pre-downsizing 
period. This could mean that the existence of unions causes performance to decrease as 
firms try to negotiate contracts that often increase labor costs. There is also evidence that 
Tobin’s Q is negatively affected by productivity in both the pre- and post-downsizing 
period. This result could be due to the fact that firms are increasing their investment in 
technology-based capital stock (i.e. computers, updated equiptment/technology) as they 
were inclined to do during the 1990s (Jensen, 1993), thereby increasing the denominator 
of the  Q calculation and decreasing the value of Tobin’s Q.47 Finally, there is evidence of 
negative interaction between managerial ownership and downsizing in the pre-downsizing 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
47 Tobin’s Q is essentially equal to the market value of the firm divided by total assets. If total assets are increasing, there is a 
corresponding decrease in Tobin’s Q, ceteris paribus.  
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period whereas there is positive interaction between ESOPs and managerial ownership in 
both the pre- and post-downsizing periods. 
 These results, while significant, offer a very complex view of the relationship 
between external shareholders, managers and employees/employee-owners. It is unclear 
whether employee ownership benefits the firm, as indicated by the significantly positive 
coefficient on the interaction variable MO*DS, or if ESOPs hurts the downsizing firm, as 
evidenced by the significantly negative parameter estimate on the ESOP variable.  
To better understand the dynamics between these stakeholders, Equations (13) and 
(14) are also analyzed individually (instead of grouped by pre- and post- downsizing 
periods) for all five time periods ( t = -2, -1, 0, 1, 2) included in the panel data. This 
regression is analyzed for all downsizing firms (N = 416) as well as for the firms separated 
by ESOP status (non-ESOPs = 312 and ESOPs = 104) for TFP and Tobin’s Q. In 
addition, quintile analysis is done for all firms, in general, as well as for ESOP versus non-
ESOP firms. The regression results for TFP and Q are shown in Tables 24 and 25, 
respectively; the quintile results are shown in Tables 26 and 27.48 
 In Table 24, the regression results for all firms for t = -2 to t = 2 are similar to the 
pre-downsizing results for TFP in Table 22. However, when the data set is separated by 
ESOP status, it becomes clear that most of the significance for downsizing firms, in 
general, is due to non-ESOP companies. With the exception of institutional ownership, 
unionization, and reorganization, ESOP firms demonstrate less significant results than 
non-ESOPs. In particular, the level of downsizing, managerial ownership, firm size, 
competitiveness, and diversification all impact the productivity of non-ESOPs. More 
importantly, there is evidence that the level of managerial ownership interacts positively 
with the level of downsizing. This is a clear indication that managers set downsizing levels 
to improve productivity.  
As for ESOP firms, there is no evidence that employee ownership plays a role in 
determining the productivity of the firm, ex post. In addition, there is evidence that 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
48 Quintile analysis was also done for Return on Assets (ROA); the results were substantially similar to the analysis on Q and so they are 
not included here. 
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institutional ownership and unionization positively affect productivity. None of the other 
explanatory variables significantly impacts the productivity of ESOP firms, with the 
exception of “Restructuring” (positive effect) and ESOP2 (negative effect).  
 Table 25 depicts the regression results for Tobin’s Q. Again, the significant result 
in the all-firms model is mainly due to the presence of non-ESOP firms. In the all-firms 
model, the level of downsizing, employee ownership, and interaction between managerial 
ownership and downsizing have negative impacts whereas merger activity, technology 
improvements, restructuring, and the interaction between managers and employees have 
positive effects. When these results are compared to ESOP versus non-ESOP firms, 
employee ownership, institutional ownership, merger activity, and manager-employee 
interaction are significant for ESOPs. These findings could be an indication that employee 
ownership and institutional ownership are at odds with the objectives of achieving high Q 
firms.49 
 Further insight is obtained from the quintile analysis of ESOP versus non-ESOP 
firms. The TFP quintiles in Table 26 for each time period show that the TFP of ESOP 
firms never sinks quite as low as that of non-ESOPs, but neither does it ascend as high as 
the productivity of non-ESOPs. Rather, the productivity of ESOP companies tends to 
hover in the middle. This “mediocre” productivity level might be an indicator of employee 
entrenchment. 
 Examining the Q quintiles in Table 27 shows an even more striking difference 
between ESOP and non-ESOPs. ESOP firms always average higher than non-ESOP in the 
lower quintiles (Q1-Q2) for each time period. However, in the upper quintiles (Q3-Q5), 
non-ESOP firms outrank them handily. Again, the “satisficing” behavior that ESOP firms 
demonstrated in both productivity and performance could indicate that agency problems 
are present within the ESOP firm and exist in a more virulent form due to the ownership 
powers that ESOP participants enjoy. 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
49 Institutional investors (such as insurance companies or other institutions that prefer steady cash inflow) often prefer “cash cow”-type 
companies that typically have low Q values. 
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Summary and Conclusion 
 
 This study examines how public companies that are partially owned by their 
employees through ESOP plans, respond to corporate downsizing two years after 
downsizing occurs. Further, it examines how that response compares to firms that have no 
ESOP plan in existence. Given the increase in employee ownership and the corresponding 
increase in downsizing activity, this is a timely opportunity to compare how two different 
labor-related events are manifested within the market in general, and the firm in particular. 
 Using means testing, panel data regression, and quintile analysis to compare the 
productivity and financial performance of ESOP versus non-ESOP companies in the pre- 
and post-downsizing period, several conclusions can be drawn. First, with respect to 
productivity, the results of the test indicate that ESOPs have very little impact on the 
productivity of the firm before or after downsizing, and there is no interaction between 
employee ownership, managerial ownership, or downsizing level.  
However, the results of the tests indicate that there is a change in the productivity 
of a downsizing firm in general. Prior to downsizing, ESOP and non-ESOP firms have 
similar levels of productivity. The data show that there is improvement in productivity in 
the two years following downsizing (time t = 0 to 2) as well as over the entire 5-year span 
(time t = –2 to 2) for firms in general. When the sample is separated by ESOP status, there 
is no indication that ESOP firms improve productivity after downsizing events (time t = 0 
to 2); it is only in the pre-downsizing time period (time t = -2 to 0) and over the entire 5-
year span (time t = -2 to 2) that we see improvement in productivity. 50 These results 
suggest that the primary objective of employee-ownership (i.e. increased productivity) has 
suffered since the adoption of the ESOP plan. Moreover, ESOP firms tend to lag behing 
non-ESOPs in terms of productivity and performance.51 In other words, with respect to 
productivity and performance, the “dark side” of ESOPs prevails. 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
50 These findings come from the means testing in Table 16. The regression results (Table 19) show slight evidence that ESOPs do affect 
the productivity of the firm, though the ESOP coefficient is positive with only a 15% level of significance. 
51 Although ESOPs perform worse tnan non-ESOPs, there is no evidence that they experience greater financial distress. 
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 So, although downsizing increases the productivity of the firm in general, it is a 
much more effective tool for motivating employees of non-ESOP firms. In fact, almost all 
of the control variables (downsizing, managerial ownership, firm size, competitiveness, 
and diversification) impact the productivity of non-ESOP firms more than the productivity 
of ESOP firms. The productivity of ESOP firms is mainly affected by institutional 
ownership, unionization, and restructuring, all of which have positive influences on 
productivity. Finally, there is evidence of interaction, but only for non-ESOPs and only 
between managerial ownership and downsizing, which impact productivity negatively. 
With respect to financial performance, the difference between an ESOP and non-
ESOP firm is more pronounced. The results show that non-ESOP firms perform 
significantly better than ESOPs in the pre-downsizing period. Despite the lower Q 
measures for ESOPs, there is no indication that ESOP firms wait too long to downsize, 
nor do they appear to experience more financial distress.  
After downsizing, both firm types show a significant change in financial 
performance. However, ESOPs and non-ESOPs have opposite changes in their financial 
performances; ESOP companies generally experience an increase in performance whereas 
non-ESOPs show a decrease. Examining ESOP firms in particular, the data show that both 
employee ownership and institutional ownership have significantly negative effects for 
ESOP firms. In other words, as the percentage of employee ownership or institutional 
ownership increases, it has a detrimental effect on the financial performance of the firm.  
With respect to interaction, there is significant interaction between managers and 
employee-owners within ESOP firms that positively impacts the performance. But 
examination of the summary statistics shows that the increase in Q for ESOPs is much 
lower than the increase for non-ESOPs. There is also evidence of interaction between the 
level of managerial ownership and downsizing that negatively influences the financial 
performance, but only for non-ESOP firms. These results indicate that although ESOPs 
have a significantly lower level of downsizing, it does not translate into increased 
productivity or performance.  
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These results establishe the need for additional research into the effect that ESOPs 
have on productivity. Future research will examine whether ESOP firms engage in more or 
less research and development and how they compare with non-ESOPs in terms of capital 
improvements. If ESOP firms value labor more than capital, they might be disinclined to 
invest in technology that reduces the need for more workers. Thus ESOP firms might have 
higher labor cost and lower capital investment, ceteris paribus, than non-ESOP firms 
(Jensen and Meckling (1979) and Faleye et al., (2005)). 
Another possible extension of the research will examine the link between 
productivity and performance. Conventional wisdom assumes that higher productivity 
leads to better financial performance; however the results from this study contradict that 
assumption. Here, as productivity increases, the financial performance of the firm (as 
measured by Tobin’s Q) actually decreases. This unusual result may be due to the time 
period under examination; the decade of the 1990s had a deep recessionary period (1990-
1992) and a booming expansionary period (1998-1999). However, during both periods, 
downsizing activity remained high even as productivity increased throughout the decade, 
fueled in part by technology growth. Thus, the 1990s saw systematic downsizing activity, 
first due to recession then due to replacement of labor with capital. By examining the 
relationship between firm performance and productivity from 1990-1999, regardless of 
downsizing activity, the results from this research can be put into proper perspective to 
understand why increases in productivity might lead to decreases in financial performance. 
The implications from the wealth effects essay and the productivity/performance 
study provide an interesting picture of the impact that employee ownership has on the 
downsizing firm. These implications are discussed in the next chapter and should be of 
interest to managers of ESOP firms as they reassess the cost and benefit of stock 
ownership plans. 
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Table 16. Description of variables used in Productivity/Performance equations. 
This table presents information on the independent variables used in the regression equations. It 
describes how each variable is calculated and the reason for inclusion. 
 
Variables  Description of Variable Reason for Inclusion 
TFP Residual from Cobb-Douglas production 
function.  
Serves as dependent variable for the 
regression equations. (Lichtenberg 
and Seigel, 1987) 
Q Tobin’s Q; ratio of firm’s capital market 
value to replacement cost of assets 
Serves as dependent variable for the 
regression equations. 
DS Percentage of workers laid off. 
Calculated as number of employees laid 
off divided by workforce of company 
Measures the level of downsizing. 
(Chen et al., 2001; Elayan et al., 
1998; Kraft, 1991) 
ESOP Percentage of the firm held by 
employees in a qualified ESOP plan 
Measure level of employee-
ownership. (Klein, 1987)  
MGR_OWN Percentage of firm held by upper 
management.  
Measures level of managerial 
ownership. (Hallock, 1998) 
INST_OWN Percentage of the firm held by 
institutional investors 
Measures impact of institutional 
ownership 
EAGE Dummy variable; 0 for non-ESOP firms; 
t+1 for each year the ESOP has been in 
existence. 
Proxy for employee-owner 
sophistication and organization. 
(Kumbhaker and Dunbar, 1993) 
HERF Inverse of number of competitors 
worldwide, measure of competition. 
Controls for market leader effect. 
(Chen et al, 2001) 
SEGS Dummy variable; Equals 1 if 
conglomerate; 0 otherwise 
Controls for diversification. (Scott 
and Ueng, 1996) 
MKTVAL Firm’s Market Value; natural log of 
market value used in regression 
Controls for firm size. (Jones and 
Kato, 1995) 
DS_REASON Dummy variable; equals 1 if firm gives 
“efficiency-improving” reason for 
downsizing, 0 otherwise. 
Controls for positive/negative 
downsizing reason. (Palmon, et al, 
1997; Chen et al, 2001) 
UNION Dummy variable; Equals 1 if unionized; 
0 otherwise 
Controls for unionization. (Brown 
and Medoff, 1978) 
MERGE 
 
Dummy Variable; equals 1 if firm had 
merger with 2 year span; 0 otherwise. 
Controls for Merger/Acquisition 
activity. 
ESOP*DS Interaction between ESOP and level of 
downsizing. 
Measures interaction between 
ESOP and downsizing. Proxy for 
agency problem. (Kraft, 1991) 
MO*DS Managerial ownership multiplied by 
level of downsizing. 
Measures interaction between 
manager ownership and downsizing. 
Proxy for agency problem. (Kraft, 
1991) 
ESOP*MO Interaction between employee ownership 
(ESOP) and managerial ownership 
(MGR_OWN). 
Measures collusion between 
employee and manager. Proxy for 
agency problem. (Gamble, 2000) 
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Table 17. Summary Statistics: Means (Standard Deviations)  
This table shows descriptive statistics for the final sample of 416 firms that downsized during the 
period 1990-1999. The “Difference in Means” column tests the null hypothesis of no difference 
between ESOP versus non-ESOP firms for each independent variable. 
 
Time Period All Firms  
Non-ESOP 
Firms  ESOP Firms  
Difference in 
Means  
DS 0.0905 
(0.1089) 
 0.1003 
(0.1166)
 0.0610 
(0.0745) 
 0.0493 
(0.0098) 
*** 
ESOP N/A N/A  0.0813 
(0.0810) 
 N/A  
EAGE N/A N/A  12.4423 
(8.3408) 
 N/A  
MGR_OWN 0.0900 
(0.1331) 
 0.1083 
(0.1448)
 0.0398 
(0.0678) 
 0.0685 
(0.0106) 
*** 
INST_OWN 0.1532 
(0.1685) 
 0.1680 
(0.1748)
 0.1087 
(0.1393) 
 0.0593 
(0.0169) 
*** 
SEGS 1.5029 
(1.4226) 
 1.5737 
(1.1735)
 2.4904 
(1.8328) 
 -0.9167 
(0.1916) 
*** 
HERF 0.0812 
(0.0814) 
 0.0849 
(0.0780)
 0.0701 
(0.0904) 
 0.0148 
(0.0099) 
 
MKTVAL 
(Millions, $) 
   5,079.121 
(10,071.590) 
  3,492.348 
(8,269.140) 
    9,839.440 
(13,104.600)
 -6,347.092 
(1,367.630) 
*** 
Number of 
Observations 
416  312  104   
Standard deviations shown (in parentheses) 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level                 
 ** Significant at the 0.05 level                   
   * Significant at the 0.10 level                    
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Table 19. Summary Statistics: Means (Standard Errors) of TFP for Various Time Periods 
This table compares the total factor productivity (TFP) for ESOP versus non-ESOP firms during the 
respective time periods. The time periods cover the 5-year span from two years before downsizing (t 
= -2) to two years after downsizing (t = 2), with time t = 0 representing the event year that 
downsizing occurred. The “Difference in Means” column tests the null hypothesis that the mean TFP 
of ESOP firms is equal to the mean TFP of non-ESOP firms during the respective time periods. 
 
Time Period All Firms  
Non-ESOP 
Firms  
ESOP 
Firms  
Difference 
in Means  
t = -2 0.0470 
(0.0296) 
 0.0653 
(0.0374) 
* -0.0082 
(0.0378)
 0.0735 
(0.0532) 
 
t = -1 0.0434 
(0.0273) 
 0.0538 
(0.0338) 
 0.0121 
(0.0409)
 0.0417 
(0.0531) 
 
t = 0 0.0915 
(0.0259) 
*** 0.1132 
(0.0317) 
*** 0.0266 
(0.0408)
 0.0866 
(0.0517) 
* 
t = 1 0.1066 
(0.0260) 
*** 0.1265 
(0.0321) 
*** 0.0468 
(0.0395)
 0.0797 
(0.0509) 
 
t = 2 0.1157 
(0.0259) 
*** 0.1439 
(0.0308) 
*** 0.0313 
(0.0458)
 0.1126 
(0.0552) 
** 
Number of 
Observations 
416  312  104    
Standard errors shown (in parentheses) 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level                 
 ** Significant at the 0.05 level                   
   * Significant at the 0.10 level                    
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Table 20. Summary Statistics: Means (Standard Errors) of Q for Various Time Periods 
This table compares the Tobin’s Q for ESOP versus non-ESOP firms during the respective time 
periods. The time periods cover the 5-year span from two years before downsizing (t = -2) to two 
years after downsizing (t = 2), with time t = 0 representing the event year that downsizing occurred. 
The “Difference in Means” column tests the null hypothesis that the mean Q of ESOP firms is equal 
to the mean Q of non-ESOP firms during the respective time periods. 
 
 
Time Period All Firms  
Non-ESOP 
Firms  
ESOP 
Firms  
Difference 
in Means  
t = -2 1.4704 
(0.0778) 
*** 1.5939 
(0.0997) 
*** 1.0997 
(0.0752)
*** 0.4942 
(0.1249) 
*** 
t = -1 1.2912 
(0.0614) 
*** 1.3630 
(0.0761) 
*** 1.0757 
(0.0882)
*** 0.2873 
(0.1165) 
** 
t = 0 1.1082 
(0.0476) 
*** 1.1123 
(0.0538) 
*** 1.0961 
(0.1009)
*** 0.0162 
(0.1144) 
 
t = 1 1.3922 
(0.1197) 
*** 1.4748 
(0.1557) 
*** 1.1443 
(0.1014)
*** 0.3305 
(0.1858) 
* 
t = 2 1.2809 
(0.0799) 
*** 1.3052 
(0.0990) 
*** 1.2079 
(0.1184)
*** 0.0973 
(0.1543) 
 
Number of 
Observations 
416  312  104    
Standard errors shown (in parentheses) 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level                 
 ** Significant at the 0.05 level                   
   * Significant at the 0.10 level                    
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Table 21. Difference in TFP and Q Means Across Different Time Periods 
This table compares the total factor productivity (TFP) and Tobin’s Q for ESOP versus non-ESOP 
firms across different time periods. The time periods cover: (1) the pre-downsizing period (t = -2 to 
0); (2) the post-downsizing period (t = 0 to 2); and (3) the 5-year span from two years before 
downsizing (t = -2) to two years after downsizing (t = 2), with time t = 0 representing the event year 
that downsizing occurred. The “Difference in TFP” section tests the null hypothesis that the mean 
TFP of ESOP firms is equal to the mean TFP of non-ESOP firms during the respective time periods. 
The “Difference in Q” section tests the null hypothesis that the mean Q of ESOP firms is equal to the 
mean Q of non-ESOP firms during the respective time periods. 
 
Difference in TFP       
Time t= 
All 
Firms  
 
Non-ESOP Firms  ESOP Firms  
-2 to 0 0.0445 (23.08) *** 0.0479 (17.26) *** 0.0348 (6.38) *** 
 0 to 2 0.0242 (13.48) *** 0.0307 (12.27) *** 0.0047 (0.78)  
-2 to 2 0.0687 (35.69) *** 0.0786 (28.66) *** 0.0395 (6.78) *** 
        
Difference in Q       
Time t= 
All 
Firms  
 
Non-ESOP Firms  ESOP Firms  
-2 to 0 -0.3622 (-81.00) *** -0.4816 (-75.09) *** -0.0036 (-0.29)  
 0 to 2 0.1727 (37.87) *** 0.1929 (30.24) *** 0.1118 (7.33) *** 
-2 to 2 -0.1895 (-34.66) *** -0.2887 (-36.29) *** 0.1082 (7.87) *** 
 
t-statistics shown (in parentheses)    
*** Significant at the 0.01 level                 
 ** Significant at the 0.05 level                   
   * Significant at the 0.10 level                    
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Table 22. Pre-Downsizing and Post-Downsizing Regressions for TFP 
This table contains multiple regression estimates based on 5-year panel data for firms that 
announced layoffs in the period 1990-1999. The dependent variable is TFP. Pre-
downsizing measures from t=-2 to t=0; post-downsizing measures t=0 to t=2. The t-
statistics (in parentheses) test the null hypothesis that the independent variable is equal to 
0. 
 Pre-Downsizing TFP Post-Downsizing TFP  
Variables 
Parameter 
Estimate t-statistic
Parameter 
Estimate t-statistic  
Intercept -0.5103 (-1.96) * 0.0193 (0.10)  
DS 0.8325 (3.66) *** -0.5983 (-3.79) *** 
ESOP -0.6139 (-1.02)  -0.0137 (-0.02)  
EAGE 0.0006 (-0.12)  -0.0031 (-0.73)  
MGR_OWN -1.2188 (-2.47) ** 0.0720 (0.37)  
INST_OWN 0.3236 (2.05) ** 0.3041 (2.09) ** 
LNMV 0.0245 (2.03) ** 0.0021 (0.23)  
HERF 0.9539 (2.80) *** 0.8723 (2.63) *** 
SEGS -0.0153 (-0.76)  -0.0270 (-1.44)  
UNION 0.0204 (0.32)  -0.0161 (-0.27)  
MERGE 0.0239 (0.31)  -0.0415 (-0.58)  
CP -0.0792 (-1.00)  -0.0629 (-0.85)  
IT 0.3048 (1.26)  0.1466 (0.65)  
CX -0.0291 (-0.38)  -0.0196 (-0.27)  
DD 0.0094 (0.13)  -0.0337 (-0.48)  
IP 0.2585 (1.71) * 0.4248 (3.02) *** 
RE 0.0374 (0.47)  0.0484 (0.65)  
ESOP*DS 1.2709 (0.38)  -0.7890 (-0.26)  
MO*DS 3.5870 (4.47) *** 0.2791 (0.42)  
ESOP*MO 3.5700 (0.79)  -0.2909 (-0.07)  
DS2 -1.4791 (-3.75) ***   
MO2 1.9659 (2.37) **   
  F = 15.62 *** F = 15.24 *** 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level                 
 ** Significant at the 0.05 level                   
   * Significant at the 0.10 level                    
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Table 23. Pre-Downsizing and Post-Downsizing Regressions for Q 
This table contains multiple regression estimates based on 5-year panel data for firms that 
announced layoffs in the period 1990-1999. The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q. Pre-
downsizing measures from t=-2 to t=0; post-downsizing measures t=0 to t=2. The t-
statistics (in parentheses) test the null hypothesis that the independent variable is equal to 
0. 
 Pre-Downsizing Q Post-Downsizing Q  
Variables 
Parameter 
Estimate t-statist ic
Parameter 
Estimate t-statistic  
Intercept  1.2609 (6.45) *** 1.2239 (4.22) *** 
DS -2.0854 (-2.78) *** -2.0997 (-2.03) ** 
ESOP -3.0874 (-2.47) ** -3.4279 (-2.09) ** 
EAGE -0.0021 (-0.18)  0.0011 (0.10)  
MGR_OWN 1.4660 (3.38) *** 0.6071 (1.07)  
INST_OWN -0.3542 (-1.10)  -0.3350 (-0.81)  
TFP -0.1361 (-1.85) * -0.2055 (-1.76) * 
HERF  0.3019 (-0.34)  -0.4928 (-0.36)  
SEGS 0.0317 (0.77)  0.0414 (0.78)  
UNION -0.2670 (-1.98) ** -0.2446 (-1.40)  
MERGE  0.3945 (2.51) ** 0.2331 (1.16)  
CP -0.0672 (-0.41)  0.1363 (0.63)  
IT  0.5685 (1.15)  1.3511 (2.15) ** 
CX -0.071 (-0.11)  0.0619 (0.30)  
DD  0.0695 (0.43)  0.0730 (0.35)  
IP  0.3041 (0.99)  0.7575 (1.93) * 
RE  0.1726 (1.04)  0.4679 (2.20) ** 
ESOP*DS 13.9650 (1.39)  7.6662 (0.45)  
MO*DS -12.0146 (-4.91) *** -2.8951 (-0.71)  
ESOP*MO 16.0086 (1.73) * 28.1443 (2.37) ** 
DS2  4.8464 (3.88) *** 2.0645 (1.08)  
  F = 1.56 ** F = 2.39 *** 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level                 
 ** Significant at the 0.05 level                   
   * Significant at the 0.10 level                    
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Table 24. Regression Estimates for Equation (13) Dependent Variable: TFP 
This table contains multiple regression estimates for the 416 firms contained in the final sample 
based on 5-year panel data for firms that announced layoffs in the period 1990-1999. There are 312 
non-ESOP and 104 ESOP firms. The dependent variable is TFP. The t-statistics (in parentheses) test 
the null hypothesis that the independent variable is equal to 0. 
 
 All Firms  Non-ESOP Firms  ESOP Firms  
Variables 
Parameter 
Estimate 
t-
statistic  
Parameter 
Estimate 
t-
statistic  
Parameter 
Estimate 
t-
statistic  
Intercept 0.4263 (2.23) *** 0.4951 (2.22) ** 0.3593 (0.90)  
DS 0.5622 (2.23) ** 0.6069 (2.09) ** 0.4314 (0.65)  
ESOP -0.0191 (-0.01)     1.5245 (1.36)  
EAGE 0.0023 (0.24)        
MGR_OWN -1.2373 (-2.67) *** -1.5590 (-3.01) *** -0.0948 (-0.07)  
INST_OWN 0.3154 (2.09) ** 0.2137 (1.23)  0.4512 (1.69) * 
LNMV -0.0193 (-2.27) ** -0.0167 (-1.72) * -0.0253 (-1.46)  
HERF 0.8706 (2.63) *** 1.1722 (2.32) ** -0.1290 (-0.29)  
SEGS -0.0098 (-0.52)  -0.0510 (-1.91) * 0.0111 (0.54)  
UNION 0.0079 (0.13)  -0.0496 (-0.64)  0.1565 (1.99) ** 
MERGE 0.0188 (0.26)  0.0596 (0.73)  -0.2310 (-1.58)  
CP -0.0727 (-0.97)  -0.0943 (-1.06)  0.1126 (0.97)  
IT 0.2639 (1.15)  0.2788 (0.75)  0.2422 (1.21)  
CX -0.0264 (-0.36)  -0.0404 (-0.46)  0-.117 (-1.15)  
DD 0.0055 (0.08)  -0.0459 (-0.51)  -0.0054 (-0.06)  
IP 0.3422 (2.39) ** 0.4761 (2.56) ** 0.1049 (0.67)  
RE 0.0423 (0.56)  -0.0546 (-0.58)  0.1797 (1.85) * 
ESOP*DS -0.1708 (-0.05)     -0.3374 (-0.08)  
MO*DS 2.8891 (3.52) *** 2.9453 (3.33) *** 0.2662 (0.05)  
ESOP*MO 4.1993 (0.98)     -0.2104 (-0.03)  
DS2 -1.8792 (-4.46) *** -1.9321 (-4.21) *** -1.6262 (-0.77)  
ESOP2 -1.6538 (-0.40)     -6.9622 (-2.01) ** 
EAGE2 -0.0002 (-0.55)        
MO2 2.0176 (2.59) *** 2.2898 (2.67) *** 3.5029 (0.58)  
 F = 11.11 ***  F = 11.29 ***  F = 5.429 ***  
*** Significant at the 0.01 level           
  ** Significant at the 0.05 level           
    * Significant at the 0.10 level                  
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Table 25. Regression Estimates for Equation (14) Dependent Variable: Q 
This table contains multiple regression estimates for the 416 firms contained in the final sample 
based on 5-year panel data for firms that announced layoffs in the period 1990-1999. There are 312 
non-ESOP and 104 ESOP firms. The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q. The t-statistics (in 
parentheses) test the null hypothesis that the independent variable is equal to 0. 
 
 
 All Firms  Non-ESOP Firms  ESOP Firms  
Variables 
Parameter 
Estimate 
t-
statistic  
Parameter 
Estimate 
t-
statistic  
Parameter 
Estimate 
t-
statistic  
Intercept 1.2780 (4.90) *** 1.0890 (3.32) *** 1.1952 (5.31) *** 
DS -2.2772 (-2.40) ** -2.2467 (-1.90) * -0.41227 (-0.56)  
ESOP -6.0311 (-1.84) *    -3.3688 (-2.49) ** 
EAGE 0.0176 (0.67)        
MGR_OWN 1.3287 (1.18)  1.1357 (2.19) ** -0.2587 (-0.13)  
INST_OWN -0.4296 (-1.18)  -0.0490 (-0.12)  -1.4991 (-2.18) ** 
TFP -0.2061 (-2.59) *** -0.2227 (-2.31) ** 0.0257 (0.32)  
HERF -0.4914 (-0.40)  -0.4709 (-0.26)  -0.1512 (-0.15)  
SEGS 0.0281 (0.62)  0.0771 (1.21)  0.0893 (1.73)  
UNION -0.2439 (-1.63)  -0.2577 (-1.34)  -0.1178 (-0.57)  
MERGE 0.3058 (1.77) * 0.2511 (1.28)  1.0438 (2.58) ** 
CP 0.0678 (0.37)  0.0447 (0.20)  -0.1303 (-0.43)  
IT 1.0655 (1.98) * 2.9302 (3.40) *** -0.4181 (-0.77)  
CX 0.0191 (0.11)  0.0263 (0.13)  0.3303 (1.24)  
DD 0.0805 (0.47)  0.1148 (0.53)  0.0241 (0.13)  
IP 0.5572 (1.66) * 0.6753 (1.53)  -0.0365 (-0.08)  
RE 0.3776 (2.08) ** 0.4588 (2.03) ** 0.1810 (0.69)  
ESOP*DS 11.9800 (0.83)     6.2289 (0.86)  
MO*DS -7.4076 (-2.10) ** -7.0726 (-1.74) * -14.1742 (-1.51)  
ESOP*MO 21.2938 (2.05) **    23.1924 (2.03) ** 
DS2 3.6047 (2.13) ** 3.5345 (1.78) *    
ESOP2 8.5264 (0.86)        
EAGE2 -0.0045 (-0.53)        
MO2 -0.6810 (-0.33)        
 F = 2.627 ***  F = 2.158 ***  F = 10.89 ***  
*** Significant at the 0.01 level       
  ** Significant at the 0.05 level             
    * Significant at the 0.10 level   
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Chapter Four 
 
Implications of Study 
Introduction 
 
 Rarely do economic conditions provide opportunities to analyze two diametrically 
opposed influences on corporate employees. However, the increase in ESOP firms 
coupled with the widespread use of downsizing, presents just such an opportunity. 
Individually, both ESOPs and downsizing have a impacts on wealth effects, productivity, and 
corporate performance. However the combination of these labor influences results in 
unexpected reactions from the market and from the workers. As one of the first papers to 
examine the relationship between ESOPs and downsizing, this study contributes 
significantly to both the ESOP and downsizing literature. More importantly, it provides a 
quasi-test of Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) hypothesis that employee stock ownership 
alleviates the agency problems within the firm. If the market believes downsizing is 
“necessary”, comparing the downsizing decisions of ESOP companies with non-ESOP 
companies (ceteris paribus) provides insight into the question of whether ESOPs resolve 
or exacerbate some of the agency problems.52  
 As documented earlier in the paper, ESOPs generally produce positive wealth effects, 
productivity gains, and financial performance whereas downsizing yields just the opposite 
effect—that is, stock price reactions are generally negative, employee morale and productivity 
decrease, and financial performance suffers following layoffs. By examining employee and 
shareholder reactions for pre- and post-downsizing periods, this study yields implications in the 
following areas: agency theory, asymmetric information, and corporate governance. Each of 
these areas will be discussed in turn. 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
52 One example of an industry that has had “necessary” downsizing is the defense industry during the late 80’s and early 90’s. With the 
end of the Cold War, many defense contractors were overstaffed and therefore, had to downsize in order to avoid bankruptcy. 
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Agency Theory 
 
 This dissertation presented two labor issues—ESOPs and downsizing—that have 
been used to resolve agency problems that exist between employees, managers, and 
investors. Unfortunately, the solutions might present agency problems of their own, 
especially when used in conjunction. This study examines the interaction effects that exist 
between ESOPs and downsizing to determine if downsizing is more or less effective in the 
presence of ESOPs.  
Three possible indications of agency problems for ESOP firms are: (1) ESOP firms 
delay downsizing for too long; (2) ESOP firms downsize at a lower, perhaps “incorrect” 
level; and (3) ESOP firms experience a smaller increase (or a decrease) in productivity as a 
result of downsizing. Each of these possibilities is examined in this study, and if 
downsizing ESOP firms experience any or all of these outcomes then it might be an 
indication that agency problems are exascerbated by employee stock ownership. 
I find that ESOP firms exhibit two of the three indications. While there is no 
evidence that ESOP firms delay downsizing decisions, they do tend to lay off fewer 
workers and the downsizing events do not translate into highly improved productivity or 
financial performance when compared to non-ESOP firm in the pre- and post-downsizing 
periods. In other words, the “dark side” of ESOPs prevails during downsizing events. 
Non-ESOP firms, on the other hand, showed a pronounced contrast to ESOP 
firms. They had larger layoffs that resulted in marked improvement in productivity from 
time t=0 to t=2. In addition, they had greater increases in Tobin’s Q. However, the post-
downsizing performance did not quite reach the level of pre-downsizing performance for 
non-ESOPs as it did for ESOP companies. Still, the results show that downsizing is a 
better motivator for non-ESOP firms than for ESOP companies. 
These findings indicate that managers of ESOP firms need to examine the 
productivity of their firms in comparison with non-ESOP firms. If ESOP firms tend to 
have more employees than non-ESOPs, ceteris paribus, then perhaps the corporate 
culture of the ESOP firm is one that encourages increases in labor-related factors of 
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production instead of capital-related factors of production. One response to the potential 
for employee entrenchment might be to increase the level of employee ownership. Recall 
that in the wealth effects study, only firms with employee ownership greater than 10 
percent experienced positive abnormal returns. 
Alternatively, ESOP managers might want to issue stock options in conjunction 
with outright stock ownership. The combination of these two instruments could encourage 
employees to look at current wealth as well as future growth of the firm. Growth in 
current wealth is encapsulated in the value of the ESOP shares allocated to the employee 
whereas future wealth is encapsulated in the options and their potential for increased 
value. In either case, more research needs to be conducted on the productive choices of 
ESOP versus non-ESOP firms in order to draw more conclusive arguments. 
One possible extension of this research might be to examine how downsizing 
decisions are made, ex ante and what factors are considered by management in setting the 
downsizing level. If the existence of the ESOP has no effect the manager’s downsizing 
decision, then managers make decisions independent of employee-owners. If the effect is 
negative, it might indicate that the manager is “captured’ by employee-owners and there is 
employee entrenchment. Alternatively, if ESOPs exert a positive influence on the the 
decision, it might indicate that there is incentive alignment between employees, managers 
and shareholders. 
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Asymmetric Information 
 
Economic and finance theory postulates that the firm is actually a nexus of 
contracts between the shareholders, managers, and employees of the firm. Within this 
nexus of contracts, the responsibilities of the manager to the shareholders and of the 
employee to the manager are explicitly defined via employment compensation contracts. In 
general, the principals (shareholders) delegate decision-making authority to appointed 
agents (board of directors and managers) who, in turn, engage more agents (employees) to 
produce goods and services. Whenever one party in the contractual relationship has more 
information than the other party, asymmetric information exists. Such a relationship exists 
automatically within the corporate setting because of the delegation of authority. 
Because the internal shareholders (managers and employees) of ESOP firms have 
more information about the firm, they are better able and better situated to expropriate 
wealth from external shareholders (regular investors and institutional investors). Although 
this study does not explicitly test for the effects of asymmetric information, there is an 
implicit recognition of information asymmetry in the formulation of the hypotheses. 
However, an analysis of the coefficients on the various stock ownership variables (ESOP, 
MGR_OWN and INST_OWN) does provide insight into the effect of information 
asymmetry. 
 In the wealth effects study, while managerial ownership is not very significant, 
institutional owners play an important role in evaluating the downsizing decisions of 
companies in general, and ESOP firms in particular. For both firm types, abnormal returns 
increase as the percentage of institutional ownership increases, which suggests that block 
investors closely watch the labor decisions of firms in their portfolio and generally agree 
with downsizing decisions. When ESOP firms are examined in detail, the results show that 
institutional investors react differently to downsizing decisions based on the level of 
employee ownership of the firm, with low- and medium-ESOP firms having a positive 
response from institutional investors and high ESOP ownership firms showing a negative 
response. The implications from this result show that investors rely on institutional owners 
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to prevent internal stakeholders (managers and employee-owners) from expropriating 
shareholder wealth from external investors. 
With respect to productivity and financial performance, the results show that 
downsizing can also be used to address the information asymmetry that exists between 
managers and employees. Prior to the downsizing announcement, both productivity and 
performance are decreasing, which might be an indication that employees are operating 
below their productive capabilities. After downsizing, the level of productivity and 
financial performance increases for both firm types. However non-ESOPs have better 
improvement in their productivity and performance than ESOP firms. 
Despite the results from the study, this research only superficially examines the 
impact of information asymmetry. A specific test for the effects of asymmetry requires a 
different type of regression analysis; most likely two-stage least squares regression. In 
conducting this type of analysis, the endogeneity of the downsizing decision can be 
explicitly modeled using instrumental variables and logit analysis. Again this potential 
analysis will be conducted at a later date.  
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Corporate Governance 
 
Corporate governance has long been an area of contention between internal 
managerial shareholders and external institutional investors who both usually serve on the 
board of directors. When risk-averse employee-owners are added to the decision-making 
process, corporate governance becomes even more indeterminate. A question arises as to 
which corporate player exerts more influence in labor decisions—managers, investors, or 
employees. More importantly, the possibility of collusion between managers and 
employee-owners exposes a potential dark-side to employee stock ownership. If internal 
owners use their ownership powers to entrench themselves in the firm, then corporate 
governance becomes an area that must be closely monitored to ensure that firm value is 
maximized. 
There are two main implications for corporate governance that flow from this 
analysis. The first implication is that the external and institutional investors of ESOP firms 
must ensure that the incentives of the internal shareholders do not become distorted as a 
result of the ESOP. External shareholders can accomplish this objective by keeping the 
level of employee ownership very small (less than 5 percent); at this level, employees have 
a limited voice in decision-making. Conversely, the same objective can be accomplished by 
increasing the level of employee ownership to very high levels (greater than 10 percent); at 
this level, a significant portion of the employees’ future wealth is tied to the firm’s 
performance. As the results of this study show, when employees own 5-10 percent of the 
firm, they have little incentive to maximize the value of the firm and might be more 
inclined to entrench themselves within the firm. 
 Another implication from the study is that institutional investors should hold a 
greater percentage of the firm than the percentage held by employees and managers 
combined. By doing so, institutional investors play an important monitoring role that 
prevents internal shareholders from expropriating firm value for themselves via 
entrenchment. This is seen in ESOP firms with less than 5 percent employee ownership; 
for these firms, the existence of employee ownership impacts abnormal returns positively. 
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 A possible extension of this research includes an examination of the the 
composition of the board of directors differ for ESOP versus non-ESOP firms. If ESOP 
boards tend to be more centralized with firm ownership concentrated in a few hands, then 
ESOP firms should perform well in terms of financial growth because no one voice 
dominates the board. Alternatively, if ESOP boards consist of only a few large block-
shareholders with the remaining shares widely dispersed, then the voice of managers 
and/or employee-owners might overwhelm the board and result in decreased corporate 
performance. 
 Regardless of the direction of future research, the employee-ownership and 
downsizing genres provide many opportunities, particularly in the arena of public policy. 
ESOPs are one of the few employee-ownership programs formally codified by the 
government in ERISA 1974. In addition, the government provides tax incentives to firms 
that adopt ESOPs. However, if the objectives of ESOPs are easily distorted by normal 
labor decisions like downsizing, then it is necessary to re-evaluate the efficacy of ESOPs 
especially when alternative employee-ownership programs exist in the form of stock 
purchase plans, stock options, and 401(k). 
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Appendix A:  Tables for Wealth Effect of Downsizing 
 
Table 28. Downsizing Firms, by 2-Digit SIC Code 
This table lists the 2-Digit SIC code for the 718 firms included in the original data set. Firms are categorized by 
ESOP status. These codes were used to separate industries when conducting regression and panel-data 
analysis. 
SIC Code  
All Firms 
(N=718) 
Non-ESOP 
Firms (N=536) 
ESOP Firms 
(N=182) 
01 Food and Kindred Products 2 2 0 
07 Agricultural Services 1 0 1 
10 Metal Mining 7 7 0 
12 Coal Mining 2 1 1 
13 Oil and Gas Extraction 14 9 5 
15 General Building Contractors 2 1 1 
16 Heavy Construction, ex. Building 2 2 0 
17 Special Trade Contractors 1 1 0 
20 Food and Kindred Products 21 14 7 
22 Textile Mill Products 7 6 1 
23 Apparel/Other Textile Products 8 8 0 
24 Lumber and Wood Products 1 0 1 
25 Furniture and Fixtures 4 3 1 
26 Paper and Allied Products 14 9 5 
27 Printing and Publishing 17 15 2 
28 Chemical and Allied Products 61 43 18 
29 Petroleum and Coal Products 12 3 9 
30 Rubber and Plastic Products 11 9 2 
31 Leather and Leather Goods 2 2 0 
32 Stone, Clay and Glass Products 3 3 0 
33 Primary Metal Industries 16 11 5 
34 Fabricated Metal Products 12 8 4 
35 Industrial Machinery and Equipment 90 78 12 
36 Electronic/Electric Equipment 67 61 6 
37 Transportation Equipment 30 16 14 
38 Instruments/Related Products 45 37 8 
39 Miscellaneous Mfg Industries 12 10 2 
40 Railroad Transportation 5 2 3 
41 Local/Interurban Passenger Transit 1 0 1 
42 Trucking and Warehousing 3 1 2 
45 Transportation by Air 11 7 4 
48 Communication 24 10 14 
49 Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services 28 14 14 
50 Wholesale Trade-Durable Goods 7 7 0 
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Appendix A:  Continued 
 
Table 28. Downsizing Firms, by 2-Digit SIC Code (Cont.) 
This table lists the 2-Digit SIC code for the 718 firms included in the original data set. Firms are categorized by 
ESOP status. These codes were used to separate industries when conducting regression and panel-data 
analysis. 
SIC Code  
All Firms 
(N=718) 
Non-ESOP 
Firms (N=536) 
ESOP Firms 
(N=182) 
51 Wholesale Trade-Nondurable Good 8 6 2 
52 Building Material/Garden Supplies 11 5 6 
54 Food Stores 1 1 0 
56 Automotive Dealers/Service Station 4 4 0 
57 Home Furnishing Stores 4 4 0 
58 Eating/Drinking Establishments 1 0 1 
59 Miscellaneous Retail 13 10 3 
60 Depository Institutions 26 14 12 
61 Non-Depository Institutions 5 3 2 
62 Security and Commodity Brokers 8 3 5 
63 Insurance Carriers 13 11 2 
64 Insurance Agents/Brokers/Service 1 0 1 
67 Holding/Investment Offices 3 3 0 
73 Business Services 55 54 1 
75 Auto Repair/Services/Parking 1 1 0 
78 Motion Pictures 5 4 1 
79 Amusement and Recreation Services 1 1 0 
80 Health Services 5 5 0 
87 Engineering and Management Svcs 4 3 1 
99 Miscellaneous 5 3 2 
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Appendix A:  Continued 
Table 29. Downsizing Firms, by Year 
This table shows the number of firms included in the final sample  
for each year. For 1990-1997, data sets are compiled using the Wall Street Journal Index. 
For 1998-1999, data sets are compiled using Human Resources Live (http://www.hrlive.com) 
 
Year All Firms 
(N=718) 
Non-ESOP 
Firms (N=536) 
ESOP Firms 
(N=182) 
1990 47 30 17 
1991 53 34 19 
1992 41 28 13 
1993 53 38 15 
1994 62 35 27 
1995 60 37 23 
1996 64 53 11 
1997 21 17 4 
1998 192 164 28 
1999 125 100 25 
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